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1. INTRODUCTION
Choice  has  obvious  and immediate  moral  significance.  The 
fact  that  a  certain  action  or  outcome  resulted  from  an  agent’s 
choice can make a crucial difference both  to our moral appraisal 
of  that agent and to our assessment of  the rights and obligations 
of  the agent and others after the action has been performed.  My 
aim in these lectures is to investigate the nature and basis of this 
significance.  The explanation  which  I  will  offer  will  be  based 
upon  a  contractualist  account  of  morality —that  is,  a  theory 
according  to  which  an  act  is  right  if  it would  be  required  or 
allowed  by  principles  which  no  one,  suitably  motivated,  could 
reasonably  reject  as  a  basis  for  informed,  unforced  general 
agreement.1
I  believe  that  it  is  possible  within  this  general  theory  of 
morality  to  explain  the  significance  of  various  familiar  moral 
notions  such  as rights, welfare,  and responsibility  in a way  that 
preserves their apparent independence rather than reducing all of 
them to one master concept such as utility.  The present  lectures 
are an attempt to carry out this project for the notions of responsi- 
bility and choice. 
This  is  a  revised  version  of  three  lectures  presented  at  Brasenose  College, 
Oxford,  on May  16,  23,  and  28, 1986.  I  am  grateful to  the  participants  in the 
seminars  following those  lectures  for  their  challenging  and  instructive comments. 
These  lectures  are the  descendants  of  a paper,  entitled  “Freedom of  the  Will in 
Political Theory,”  which  I  delivered at a meeting of  the Washington, D.C., Area 
Philosophy Club in November  1977.  Since that  time I have presented many inter- 
vening versions  to various audiences.  I am indebted to members of  those audiences 
and  to  numerous  other  friends  for comments,  criticism,  and  helpful  suggestions.
1I have set out my version of contractualism in “Contractualism and Utili- 
tarianism,”  in  Amartya  Sen  and  Bernard  Williams,  eds.,  Utilitarianism  and  Beyond 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  1982), pp. 103-28. What follows can be 
seen as  an attempt to fulfill, for the case of  choice, the promissory remarks made at 
the end of  section III of  that paper. 
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2. THE PROBLEMS  OF FREE WILL 
Quite  apart  from  this  general  theoretical  project,  however, 
there is another, more familiar reason for inquiring into the basis 
of  the moral significance of  choice.  This is the desire to under- 
stand and respond to the challenge to that significance which has 
gone under the heading of  the problem of free will. This problem 
has a number of  forms.  One form identifies free will with a per- 
son’s freedom to act otherwise than he or she in fact did or will. 
The problem, on this view, is the threat to this freedom posed by 
deterministic conceptions of  the universe.  A second, related prob- 
lem is whether determinism, if  true, would deprive us of the kind 
of  freedom, whatever it may be, which is presupposed by  moral 
praise  and blame.  This version  of  the problem  is closer  to my 
present concern in  that it has  an explicitly moral dimension.  In 
order to address it one needs to find out what the relevant kind 
of  freedom is, and this question can be approached by  asking what 
gives free choice and free action their special moral significance. 
Given an answer to this question, which is the one I am primarily 
concerned with, we can then ask how the lack of  freedom would 
threaten  this  significance and  what kinds  of  unfreedom  would 
do so. 
The challenge I have in mind, however, is not posed by  deter- 
minism  but by  what I call the Causal Thesis.  This is the thesis 
that the events which are human actions, thoughts, and decisions 
are linked to antecedent events by  causal laws as deterministic as 
those  governing  other  goings-on  in  the universe.  According  to 
this  thesis,  given  antecedent conditions and the laws of  nature, 
the  occurrence of  an  act  of  a  specific kind follows, either with 
certainty or with a certain degree of probability, the indeterminacy 
being due to chance factors of  the sort involved in other natural 
processes.  I am concerned with this thesis rather than with deter- 
minism  because it seems to me that the space opened up by  the 
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were  filled  by  something  other  than  the  cumulative  effects  of 
indeterministic physical processes, If  the actions we perform result 
from  the  fact  that we  have  a  certain  physical  constitution  and 
have been subjected to certain outside influences, then an apparent 
threat to morality remains, even if  the links between these causes 
and their effects are not deterministic. 
The idea that there is such a threat is sometimes supported by 
thought experiments such as the following: Suppose you were to 
learn that someone’s present state of mind, intentions, and actions 
were produced in him or her a few minutes ago by  the action of 
outside forces, for example by  electrical stimulation of the nervous 
system.  You would not think it appropriate to blame that person 
for what he or she does under such conditions.  But if  the Causal 
Thesis is true then all of  our actions are like this.  The only dif- 
ferences are in the form of  outside intervention  and the span of 
time over which it occurs, but surely these are not essential to the 
freedom of  the agent. 
How might this challenge be  answered? One strategy would 
be to argue that there are mistakes in the loose and naive idea of 
causality to which  the challenge appeals or in the assumptions it 
makes  about  the  relation  between  mental  and  physical  events. 
There is obviously much to be said on both of  these topics.  I pro- 
pose, however, to follow a different  (but equally familiar)  line. 
Leaving the concepts of cause and action more or less unanalyzed, 
I will argue that the apparent force of  the challenge rests on mis- 
taken  ideas about the nature of  moral blame and responsibility.2
2In  his  admirably  clear  and  detailed  defense  of  incompatibilism,  Peter  van 
Inwagen  observes  that  if  one  accepts the premises of  his  argument for the incom- 
patibility of  determinism  and free will  (in the sense required  for moral  responsi- 
bility)  then  it is  “puzzling”  how people could have the kind  of  freedom required 
for  moral  responsibility even  under  indeterministic  universal  causation.  (See  An 
Essay on Free Will [Oxford:  Oxford University Press,  1983], pp. 149-50.)  On the 
other hand, he takes  it to be not merely  puzzling but inconceivable  that free will 
should  be  impossible  or  that  the premises  of  his  arguments for incompatibilism 
should be false or that the rules of  inference which these arguments employ should 
be  invalid.  This  leads  him,  after  some  further  argument,  to  reject  determinism: 
“If  incompatibilism is  true,  then  either determinism or the free-will  thesis is false. 154  The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 
It  has  sometimes  been  maintained  that  even  if  the  Causal 
Thesis holds, this does not represent the kind of  unfreedom that 
excuses agents from moral blame.  That kind of  unfreedom, it is 
sometimes  said,  is  specified  simply  by  the  excusing  conditions 
which  we generally recognize: a person is acting unfreely in the 
relevant sense only if  he or she is acting under posthypnotic sug- 
gestion, or under duress, is insane, or falls under some other gen- 
erally recognized excusing condition.  Since the Causal Thesis does 
not imply that people are always acting under one or another of 
these conditions, it does not imply that moral praise  and blame 
are generally inapplicable. 
I am inclined to think that there is something right about this 
reaffirmation  of  common  sense.  But  in this  simple form it has 
been  rightly  rejected  as  question  begging.  It begs  the question 
because it does not take  account of  the claim that commonsense 
morality itself  holds that people cannot be blamed for what they 
do when  their  behavior  is  the result  of  outside causes, a claim 
which  is  supported by  our reactions  to imaginary cases  like the 
thought experiment mentioned  above and by  more general reflec- 
tion on what a world of  universal causality would be like. 
In order to show that moral praise and blame are compatible 
with  the Causal  Thesis, it is necessary to rebut  this claim.  The 
most  promising  strategy  for  doing  so  is  to  look  for  a  general 
account of  the moral significance of  choice, an account which, on 
To  deny the free-will  thesis  is  to  deny the existence of  moral responsibility, which 
would be absurd.  Moreover, there seems to be no good reason to accept determinism 
(which, it should be recalled, is  not  the  same as the Principle of  Universal Causa- 
tion).  Therefore,  we should  reject  determinism”  (p. 223). 
My  response  is  somewhat  different.  Determinism  is  a very general empirical 
thesis.  Our  convictions  about  moral  responsibility  seem  to  me  an  odd  basis  for 
drawing  a conclusion  one way  or the other about such a claim.  In addition, what- 
ever  one  may  decide  about  determinism, it remains puzzling how  moral  responsi- 
bility  could  be  compatible with  Universal  Causation.  I  am  thus  led  to  wonder 
whether  our  initial  assumptions  about  the  kind  of  freedom  required  by  moral 
responsibility  might  not  be  mistaken.  Rather  than  starting with  a reinterpretation 
of  the principle of  alternative possibilities  (along the lines of  the conditional analy- 
sis), my  strategy  is  to  ask first, Why does the fact  of  choice matter morally? and 
then, What kind of freedom is relevant to mattering in that way? 
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the one hand, explains why  the significance of  choice is under- 
mined  both  by  commonly recognized  excusing conditions and by 
factors such as those imagined to be at work in the thought experi- 
ment  described  above and, on the other hand, explains why the 
moral  significance of  choice will not be  undermined everywhere 
if  the Causal Thesis is true. Such an account, if  convincing, would 
provide a basis for arguing that our initial response to the Causal 
Thesis was mistaken.  At the very least, it would shift the burden 
of  argument to the incompatibilist, who would  need  to explain 
why the proffered  account of  the moral significance of  choice was 
inadequate.  Before  beginning my  search  for  an account  of  the 
significance of  choice, however, I will take a moment to examine 
some other forms of the free-will problem. 
The problem of  free will is most often discussed as a problem 
about moral responsibility, but essentially the same problem arises 
in  other forms as well.  It arises in political philosophy, for ex- 
ample, as a problem about the significance of choice as a legitimating 
condition.  We  generally  think  that  the  fact  that  the  affected 
parties chose or assented to an outcome is an important factor in 
making that outcome legitimate.  But we also recognize that there 
are conditions under which acquiescence does not have this legiti- 
mating  force.  These include  conditions  like those  listed  above: 
hypnosis, brain stimulation, mental incapacity, brainwashing, and 
so on.  To many, at least, it seems plausible to maintain that these 
conditions deprive choice of its moral significance because they are 
conditions under which  the agent’s action is the result of  outside 
causes.  But if  the Causal Thesis holds, this is true of  all actions, 
and it would follow that choice never has moral significance as a 
legitimating factor. 
Let me turn to a different example, drawn from John Rawls’s 
book,  A  Theory of  Justice.3  (I believe  the example involves  a 
misinterpretation  of  Rawls, albeit a fairly natural one, but I will 
3A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 
pp. 72-74, 104. 156  The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 
try to correct that later.)  Replying to an argument for the justice 
of a  purely  laissez-faire economy, Rawls observes that in such a 
system  economic  rewards  would  be  unacceptably  dependent  on 
factors such as innate talents and fortunate family circumstances, 
which  are, as he puts it, “arbitrary from a moral point of view.” 
In particular, he says that even such factors as willingness to exert 
oneself will depend to a large extent on family circumstances and 
upbringing.  Therefore we cannot  say, of  those who might have 
improved their economic position if  they had exerted themselves, 
that because  their  predicament  is  their  own doing  they have no 
legitimate complaint.  Their lack of  exertion has no legitimating 
force because it is the result of  “arbitrary factors.” 
But  this  argument,  if  successful,  would  seem  to prove  too 
much.  Consider a society satisfying Rawls’s Difference  Principle. 
This principle  permits some inequalities, such  as those resulting 
from incentives which improve productivity enough to make every- 
one better  off.  When such inequalities exist, they will be due to 
the fact that some people have responded to these incentives while 
others have not.  If  the Causal  Thesis is correct,  however, there 
will  be  some causal  explanation of these differences in behavior. 
They will not be due to gross differences in economic status, since, 
by  hypothesis, these do not exist.  But they must be due to some- 
thing,  and it  seems clear  that  the factors responsible,  whatever 
they  are,  are likely  to be  as  “morally arbitrary” in  at least one 
sense of that phrase as the factors at work in the case of the laissez- 
faire society  to which  Rawls was  objecting.  To sustain Rawls’s 
argument,  then, we need  a  better  explanation  of  how  “morally 
arbitrary” background conditions  can undermine the legitimating 
force of  choice, an explanation which  will not deprive all choice 
of moral force if the Causal Thesis is correct. 
Let me mention a further, slightly different case. We think it 
important that a political system should, as we say, “leave people 
free  to make  up  their  own minds,”  especially  about important 
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certain  conditions as  incompatible  with  this  important  freedom 
and  therefore  to  be  avoided.  Brainwashing  is  one extreme ex- 
ample, but there are also more moderate, and more common, forms 
of  manipulation, such as strict control of  sources of  information, 
bombardment with one-sided information, and the creation of an 
environment in which people are distracted from certain questions 
by  fear or other competing stimuli.  What is it that is bad about 
these conditions? If  they count as conditions of unfreedom simply 
because  they  are conditions  under  which  people’s opinions  are 
causal products of  outside factors, then there is no such thing as 
“freedom of  thought” if  the Causal  Thesis is correct.  It would 
follow that  defenders of  “freedom of  thought”  who accept  the 
Causal Thesis could rightly  be  accused of  ideological blindness  : 
what they advocate as “freedom” is really just determination by a 
different set of outside factors, factors which are less rational and 
no more benign  than those to which they object.  There may be 
good reasons  to favor some determining factors over others, but 
the issue cannot be one of “freedom.”  Here again, then, the prob- 
lem  is  to  show  that  “determination by  outside causes”  is  not a 
sufficient condition for unfreedom. To do this we need to come 
up with  some other explanation of  what is bad  about the condi- 
tions which  supporters of  freedom of  thought condemn.4 
These are versions of what I will call the political problem of 
free will.  As I have said, they have much the same structure as the 
more frequently discussed problem about moral praise and blame. 
In addition  to these problems  there is what might be called the 
personal  problem of  free will.  If  I were to learn that one of my 
past  actions  was  the  result  of  hypnosis  or  brain  stimulation, I 
would feel alienated from this act: manipulated, trapped, reduced 
to the status of  a puppet.  But why, if  the Causal Thesis is correct, 
should we not feel this way  about all of  our acts? Why should 
4I  have  said  more  about  this  version  of  the  problem  in  section  IIB  of  “Free- 
dom  of  Expression  and  Categories  of  Expression,”  University  of  Pittsburgh  Law 
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we not feel trapped all the time? This is like the other problems 
in that what we need in order to answer it is a better explanation 
of why it is proper  to feel trapped and alienated from our own 
actions in cases like hypnosis, an explanation which goes beyond 
the mere fact of  determination by  outside factors.  But while this 
problem is like the others in its form, it differs from them in not 
being specifically a problem about morality: the significance with 
which it deals is not moral significance.  This makes it a particu- 
larly difficult problem, much of  the difficulty being that of explain- 
ing what the  desired but threatened  form of  significance is sup- 
posed  to  be.  Since my  concern  is with  moral  theory  I  will not 
address this problem directly, though the discussion of  the value 
of choice in lecture 2 will have some bearing on it. 
I will be concerned in these lectures with the first two of these 
problems and with the relation between them: to what degree can 
the “better explanation” that each calls for be provided within the 
compass of  a single, reasonably unified theory? My strategy is to 
put forward two theories which attempt to explain why the con- 
ditions which we commonly recognize as undermining  the moral 
significance of  choice in various  contexts  should have this effect. 
These theories, which I will refer to as the Quality of Will theory 
and the Value of  Choice theory,  are  similar to the theories put 
forward in two  famous articles, P.  F. Strawson’s “Freedom and 
Resentment,”5  and  H.  L.  A.  Hart’s  “Legal  Responsibility  and 
Excuses.”6  My  aim  is  to  see  whether  versions  of  these  two 
approaches —extended  in  some respects  and modified  in others 
to  fit  within  the  contractualist  theory  I  espouse  —  can  be  put 
together into a single coherent account.  We can then see how far 
this  combined  theory  takes  us  toward  providing  a  satisfactory 
account of the moral significance of choice across the range of 
cases I have listed above. 
5In  Strawson,  ed.,  Studies  in  the  Philosophy  of  Thought  and  Action  (Oxford: 
6 Chapter  2 of  Hart, Punishment  and  Responsibility  (Oxford: Oxford Univer- 
Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 71-96. 
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3. THE INFLUENCEABILITY THEORY 
Before presenting the Quality of  Will theory, it will be help- 
ful  to  consider  briefly  an  older  view  which  serves  as  a  useful 
benchmark. This view, which I will call the Influenceability theory, 
employs a familiar strategy for explaining conditions which excuse 
a person from moral blame.7  This strategy is first to identify the 
purpose or rationale of moral praise and blame and then to show 
that this rationale fails when the standard excusing conditions are 
present.  According to the Influenceability theory,  the purpose of 
moral praise and blame is to influence people’s behavior.  There is 
thus no point in praising or blaming agents who are not (or were 
not)  susceptible  to being  influenced  by  moral suasion, and it is 
this fact which  is reflected in the commonly recognized  excusing 
conditions. 
The difficulties with this theory are, I think, well known.8 I 
will not go into them here except to make two brief points. The 
first is that the theory appears to conflate the question of whether 
moral  judgment  is  applicable  and  the  question  of  whether  it 
should be expressed  (in particular, expressed to the agent).  The 
second  point  is  that  difficulties  arise  for  the  theory  when  it  is 
asked whether what matters is influenceability at or shortly before 
the time  of  action or influenceability  at the  (later)  time when 
moral  judgment  is  being  expressed.  The  utilitarian  rationale 
for praise  and blame  supports the latter interpretation, but it is 
the  former  which  retains  a  tie  with  commonsense  notions  of 
responsibility. 
7See J. J. C. Smart, “Freewill, Praise, and Blame,” Mind 70 (1961) : 291- 
306;  reprinted  in  G.  Dworkin,  ed.,  Determinism,  Free  Will,  and  Moral  Responsi- 
bility  (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,  1970; page references will be to this 
edition).  The theory was stated earlier by  Moritz Schlick in chapter 7 of  The Prob - 
lems  of Ethics,  trans.  D.  Rynin  (New York:  Prentice-Hall,  1939), reprinted  as 
“When  Is  a  Man  Responsible?”  in  B.  Berofsky,  ed.,  Free  Will  and  Determinism 
(New York: Harper and Row,  1966; page references will be to this edition). 
8Some are set forth  by Jonathan Bennett in section 6 of “Accountability,” in 
Zak  van  Staaten,  ed.,  Philosophical  Subjects  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press, 
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The Influenceability  theory  might  explain  why  a  utilitarian 
system of behavior control would include something like what we 
now recognize as excusing conditions.  What some proponents of 
the theory  have had in mind is that commonsense notions of  re- 
sponsibility should be given up and replaced by  such a utilitarian 
practice.  Whatever  the merits  of  this  proposal,  however,  it is 
clear  that  the  Influenceability  theory  does  not  provide  a  satis- 
factory  account  of  the  notions  of  moral  praiseworthiness  and 
blameworthiness  as  we  now  understand  them.  The usefulness 
of  administering  praise  or  blame  depends  on too  many  factors 
other than the nature of  the act in question for there ever to be a 
good  fit  between  the  idea  of  influenceability  and  the  idea  of 
responsibility which we now employ.9
4. QUALITY OF WILL: STRAWSON'S ACCOUNT
The view which  Strawson presents  in “Freedom and Resent- 
ment” is clearly superior to the Influenceability theory.  Like that 
theory, however, it focuses less on the cognitive content of  moral 
judgments than on what people are doing in making them.  The 
centerpiece of Strawson’s analysis is the idea of a reactive attitude. 
It is the nature of  these attitudes that they are reactions not simply 
to  what happens to us  or  to  others but  rather  to  the  attitudes 
toward  ourselves  or  others  which  are  revealed  in  an  agent’s 
actions.  For example, when you tread on my  blistered toes, I may 
feel excruciating pain and greatly regret that my toes were stepped 
on.  In addition, however, I  am likely to resent  the malevolence 
or callousness or indifference to my pain which your action indi- 
cates.  This resentment is what Strawson calls a “personal reactive 
attitude”: it is my  attitudinal reaction  to the attitude toward me 
which is revealed in your action.  Moral indignation, on the other 
9Broadening  the  theory  to  take  into  account  the  possibility  of  influencing 
people other than the agent will produce a better fit in some cases, but at the price of 
introducing  even  more considerations which  are intuitively irrelevant to  the  ques- 
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hand,  is what  he  calls  a  “vicarious  attitude”:  a  reaction  to  the 
attitude  toward  others  in  general  (e.g., lack  of  concern  about 
their  pain)  which  your  action  shows you  to have.  All of  these 
are  what  Strawson  calls  “participant  attitudes.”  They  “belong 
to  involvement  or  participation  with  others  in  inter-personal 
human  relationships.”10  This  is  in  contrast  to  “objective  atti- 
tudes,’’ which  involve  seeing  a  person  “as  an object  of  social 
policy; as an object for what in a wide range of  senses might be 
called treatment; as something certainly to be taken account, per- 
haps precautionary account, of; to be managed or handled or cured 
or trained.”11 
It follows from this characterization that the discovery of  new 
facts about an action or an agent can lead to the modification or 
withdrawal  of  a  reactive  attitude  in  at  least  three  ways:  (a)  by 
showing that the action was not, after all, indicative of the agent’s 
attitude toward ourselves or others; (b) by  showing that the atti- 
tude indicated in the act was not one which makes a certain reac- 
tive  attitude  appropriate;  (c)  by  leading  us  to  see  the  agent  as 
someone  toward  whom  objective,  rather  than  participant,  atti- 
tudes are appropriate. 
Commonly recognized excusing conditions work in these ways. 
The most  extreme  excusing  conditions  sever  any  connection  be- 
tween an action  (or movement)  and the attitudes of  the agent. 
If your stepping on my toes was a mere bodily movement resulting 
from an epileptic seizure, then it shows nothing at all about your 
concern or lack of  concern about my pain.  It would therefore be 
inappropriate  for me to resent your  action  or for someone else, 
taking a more impartial view, to feel moral disapproval of you on 
that account. 
Other  excusing  conditions  have  the  less  extreme  effect  of 
modifying  the quality  of  will  which  an action  can  be  taken  to 
indicate, thus modifying the reactive attitudes which are appropri- 
10Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” p. 79. 
11Ibid. 162  The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 
ate.  If I learn, for example, that you stepped on my foot by acci- 
dent, then I can no longer resent your callousness or malevolence, 
but I may still, if  conditions are right, resent your carelessness.  If 
I learn that you (reasonably) believed that the toy spider on my 
boot was real, and that you were saving my life by killing it before 
it could bite me, then I can no longer  resent your action at all, 
although it remains  indicative  of  a particular  quality of  will on 
your part. 
Actions produced  by  posthypnotic suggestion  are a less clear 
case.  Much depends on what we take the hypnosis to do.  Hypno- 
sis might lead you to perform the intentional act of stamping your 
foot on mine but without any malice or even any thought that you 
are causing me harm.  In this case a criticizable attitude is indi- 
cated by  your act: a kind of  complacency toward touching other 
people’s bodies in ways  that you  have reason  to believe are un- 
wanted.  But  this attitude is not really  attributable to you.  You 
may  not  lack  any  inhibition  in  this  regard:  it is  just  that your 
normal inhibition has been inhibited by the hypnotist.  The case is 
similar if  the hypnotist implants in you a passing hatred for me 
and  a fleeting  but  intense desire  to cause me pain.  Here again 
there is a criticizable attitude —more serious this time — but it is 
not yours.  It is “just visiting,” so to speak. 
Strawson’s  account  of  why  conditions  such  as  insanity  and 
extreme immaturity excuse people from moral blame is less satis- 
factory.  The central idea is that these conditions lead us to take an 
“objective attitude” toward a person rather than to see him or her 
as  a  participant  in  those  interpersonal  human  relationships  of 
which the reactive attitudes are a part.  Strawson’s claim here can 
be understood on two levels.  On the one hand there is the empiri- 
cal  claim  that when  we  see  someone  as  “warped or  deranged, 
neurotic or just a child . . . all our reactive attitudes tend to be pro- 
foundly  modified.”l2  In  addition  to  this,  however,  there  is  the 
12Ibid. My appreciation of this straightforwardly factual reading of Strawson’s 
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suggestion  that  these  factors  render  reactive  attitudes  such  as 
resentment and indignation inappropriate.  But Strawson’s theory 
does not explain the grounds of  this form of  inappropriateness as 
clearly as  it explained the grounds of  the other excusing condi- 
tions.  In fact, aside from the references to interpersonal relation- 
ships, which  are  left unspecified, nothing is  said on  this  point. 
In other cases, however, Strawson’s theory succeeds in giving 
a better explanation of  commonly recognized excusing conditions 
than that offered by  the idea that a person is not to be blamed for 
an action which is the result of  outside causes.  The mere fact of 
causal  determination  seems  to  have  little  to  do  with  the  most 
common  forms of  excuse, such  as  accident  and mistake  of  fact. 
It is  a  distinct  advantage of  Strawson’s analysis that it accounts 
for the force of  more extreme excuses such as hypnosis and brain 
stimulation in a way that is continuous with a natural explanation 
of  these less extreme cases as well.  Moreover, his theory can ex- 
plain the relevance of  “inability to do otherwise” in several senses 
of  that phrase.  Sometimes, as in the case of  brain stimulation, the 
factors which underlie this inability sever any connection between 
an action and the agent’s attitudes.  In other cases, “inability to do 
otherwise”  in  the  different  sense of  lack of  eligible  alternatives 
can modify the quality of  will indicated by  an agent’s willingness 
to choose a particular course of action.  For example, if you stamp 
on  my  toes  because  my  archenemy, who is  holding  your  child 
hostage next door, has ordered you  to do so, this does not make 
you less responsible  for your act. The act is still fully yours, but the 
quality of will which it indicates on your part is not blameworthy. 
As  Strawson observes, these appeals to “inability to do other- 
wise’’ do not generalize.  The truth of  the Causal Thesis would 
not mean that either of these forms of inability obtained generally 
or that actions never indicated the presence in the agent of  those 
attitudes  or  qualities  of  will which  make  resentment  or  moral 
indignation appropriate. 164  The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 
Like  the  unsuccessful  defense  of  common  sense  mentioned 
above, Strawson’s analysis is internal to our moral concepts as we 
now  understand  them.  Its  explanation  of  the conditions which 
negate or modify moral responsibility rests on a claim that, given 
the kind of  thing that moral indignation is, it is an appropriate 
response  only  to actions which  manifest certain attitudes on the 
part of  the agent.  This internal character may be thought to be a 
weakness  in  Strawson’s  account,  and  he  himself  considers  an 
objection  of  this  sort.  The objection  might  be  put  as follows: 
You have shown what is and is not appropriate given the moral 
notions we now have; but the question is whether, if  the Causal 
Thesis is correct, it would not be irrational to go  on using those 
concepts and holding the attitudes they describe.  Strawson’s direct 
response  to this  objection  is to  say  that the change proposed  is 
“practically inconceivable.” 
The human commitment to participation in ordinary interper- 
sonal relationships is, I think, too thoroughgoing and deeply 
rooted for us to take seriously the thought that a general con- 
viction might so change our world  that, in it, there were no 
longer  any  such  things  as  inter-personal  relationships  as we 
normally  understand  them;  and  being  involved  in  inter- 
personal  relationships  as we  normally  understand  them  pre- 
cisely is being  exposed to the range of  reactive attitudes and 
feelings that is in question.13
But  there  is  another  reply  which  is  suggested by  something 
that  Strawson  goes  on  to  say  and  which  seems  to  me  much 
stronger.14 This reply points out that the principle “If your action 
was  a  causal  consequence  of  prior  factors  outside your  control 
then you cannot properly be praised or blamed for performing it” 
derives its strength from its claim to be supported by  commonsense 
morality.  Consequently, if  an analysis such as Strawson’s succeeds 
13 Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” p. 82. 
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in giving  a convincing  account of  the requirements of  freedom 
implicit  in  our  ordinary  moral  views  —  in  particular,  giving  a 
systematic  explanation  of  why  commonly  recognized  excusing 
conditions should excuse — then this is success enough.  Succeed- 
ing this far undermines the incompatibilist challenge by  striking 
at its supposed basis in everyday moral thought.I5 
Plausible and appealing though it is, there are several respects 
in which Strawson’s analysis is not fully satisfactory.  One of these 
has  already been  mentioned  in connection  with  insanity.  Straw- 
son suggests that the attitudes which moral judgments express are 
appropriately  held  only  toward  people  who  are  participants  in 
certain  interpersonal  relationships  and  that  these  attitudes  are 
therefore inhibited when we  become  aware of  conditions which 
render  a person  unfit  for these  relationships.  But  one needs to 
know more about what these relationships are, about why moral 
reactive attitudes depend on them, and about how these relation- 
ships are undermined or ruled out by factors such as insanity. 
A  second problem  is  more  general.  Strawson  explains why 
certain  kinds  of  unfreedom  make  moral  praise  and  blame  in- 
applicable by appealing to a fact about interpersonal reactive atti- 
tudes in general  (and moral ones in particular), namely the fact 
that they  are  attitudes  toward  the  attitudes of  others,  as  mani- 
fested in  their  actions.  But  one may  wonder  whether  anything 
further can be said about why attitudes of moral approval and dis- 
approval are of  this general  type.  Moreover, it is not clear that 
moral judgments need  always involve the expression of  any par- 
15Compare Thomas Nagel’s comments on Strawson’s theory in The View from
Nowhere  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  1986), pp, 124-26.  The response  I 
am  advocating  here  does  not  deny  the  possibility  of  what  Nagel  has  called  “ex- 
ternal”  criticism  of  our  practices  of  moral  evaluation.  It  tries  only  to  deny  the 
incompatibilist  critique a foothold  in  our ordinary  ideas  of  moral responsibility.  It 
claims that a commitment to freedom which is  incompatible with the Causal Thesis 
is not embedded  in our ordinary moral practices  in the way in which a commitment 
to  objectivity  which outruns our experience is embedded  in the content of  our ordi- 
nary empirical  beliefs.  The incompatibilist response,  obviously, is to deny this claim. 
My  point is  that the  ensuing  argument, which I  am trying to  advance one side of, 
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ticular reactive attitude.  For example, I may believe that an action 
of  a  friend,  to  whom  many  horrible  things  have  recently  hap- 
pened, is morally blameworthy.  But need this belief, or its expres- 
sion, involve a feeling or expression of  moral indignation or dis- 
approval  on my  part?  Might I not agree that what he did was 
wrong  but  be  incapable  of  feeling  disapproval  toward  him? 
Here Strawson’s analysis faces a version of  one of  the objec- 
tions to the Influenceability theory: it links the content of  a moral 
judgment  too  closely  to  one  of  the things  that may  be  done in 
expressing  that judgment.  Of  course, Strawson  need  not claim 
that moral judgment always involves the expression of  a reactive 
attitude.  It would be enough to say that such a judgment always 
makes  some  attitude  (e.g.,  disapproval)  appropriate.  But  then 
one wonders what the content of this underlying judgment is and 
whether  the  requirement  of  freedom  is not  to  be  explained  by 
appeal to this content rather than to the attitudes which it makes 
appropriate. 
In order to answer these questions one needs a more complete 
account of  moral blameworthiness.  A number of  different moral 
theories might be called upon for this purpose, but what I will do 
is to sketch briefly how a Quality of  Will theory might be based 
on a contractualist account of moral judgment. 
5.  QUALITY OF WILL: A CONTRACTUALIST ANALYSIS
According to contractualism as I understand it, the basic moral 
motivation  is  a  desire  to  regulate  one’s behavior  according  to 
standards that others could not reasonably reject insofar as they, 
too,  were  looking  for  a  common  set  of  practical  principles. 
Morality,  on  this  view,  is  what  might  be  called  a  system  of 
co-deliberation.  Moral reasoning is an attempt to work out prin- 
ciples which  each  of  us  could be  expected  to employ as a basis 
for deliberation and to accept as a basis for criticism.  To believe 
that one  is morally  at fault is just  to believe that one has  not 
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require.  This can be  so either because one has  failed to attend 
to  considerations  that such standards would require one to  take 
account of  or because one has consciously acted contrary to what 
such standards would require.  If  one is concerned, as most people 
are to at least  some extent, to be  able to justify one’s actions to 
others  on  grounds  they  could  not  reasonably  reject,  then  the 
realization that one has failed in these ways will normally produce 
an attitude of  serious self-reproach.  But this attitude is  distinct 
from the belief which may give rise to it.  Similarly, to believe that 
another person’s behavior  is morally  faulty is, at base, to believe 
that there is a divergence of  this kind between the way that person 
regulated his or her behavior and the kind of  self-regulation that 
mutually  acceptable  standards  would  require.  For  reasons  like 
those  just  mentioned,  this  belief  will normally be  the basis  for 
attitudes of  disapproval and indignation.  This view of  morality 
grounds the fact that moral appraisal is essentially concerned with 
“the quality  of  an  agent’s will” in  an account of  the nature of 
moral  reasoning  and moral  motivation.  The analysis of  moral 
judgment which it supports is essentially cognitivist.  It can explain 
why moral judgments would normally be accompanied by  certain 
attitudes,  but  these  attitudes  are not the basis of  its account of 
moral judgment. 
Contractualism  also  gives  specific  content  to  the  idea,  sug- 
gested  by  Strawson, that moral judgments presuppose a form of 
interpersonal relationship.  On this view, moral judgments apply 
to people considered  as possible  participants  in  a  system of  co- 
deliberation.  Moral praise and blame can thus be rendered inap- 
plicable  by  abnormalities which  make this kind of  participation 
impossible.  (The implications of this idea for excusing conditions 
such as insanity will be discussed below.) 
6. THE SPECIAL FORCE OF MORAL JUDGEMENT
Insofar as it goes beyond Strawson’s theory in committing itself 
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contractualist view I have described leaves itself open to the objec- 
tion that this notion of  blameworthiness  requires a stronger form 
of  freedom, a form which may be incompatible with the Causal 
Thesis.  In order to assess this objection, it will be helpful to com- 
pare  the  contractualist  account of  blame  with  what Smart calls 
“praise and dispraise.”  According to Smart, we commonly use the 
word  “praise”  in  two  different  ways.16  On  the  one  hand,  praise 
is the opposite of  blame.  These terms apply only to what a person 
does or to aspects of  a person’s character, and they are supposed 
to carry a special force of  moral approval or condemnation.  But 
we also praise things other than persons and their character: the 
California climate, the flavor of  a melon, or the view from a cer- 
tain hill.  In this sense we also praise features of  persons which 
we see as “gifts” beyond their control: their looks, their coordina- 
tion, or their mathematical ability.  Praise in this sense is not the 
opposite of  blame, and Smart coins the term “dispraise” to denote 
its negative correlate.  Praise and dispraise lack the special force 
of  moral approval or condemnation which praise and blame are 
supposed to have.  To  praise or dispraise something is simply to 
grade it. 
Smart takes the view that the kind of moral judgment involved 
in  praise  and blame  as  these  terms  are normally  used  must  be 
rejected  because  it presupposes  an  unacceptable metaphysics  of 
free will.  However, we can praise and dispraise actions and char- 
acter just as we can grade eyes and skill and mountain peaks.  The 
primary function of  praise in this  “grading” sense, according to 
Smart,  is  just  “to  tell  people  what  people  are  like.”17  However,
since people like being praised and dislike being dispraised, praise 
and dispraise also have the important secondary function of  serv- 
ing to encourage or discourage classes of  actions.  Smart suggests 
that “clear-headed people,” insofar as they use the terminology of 
praise and blame, will use it only in this “grading” sense and will 
16Smart, “Freewill, Praise, and Blame,” p. 210. 
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restrict its use to cases in which this important secondary function 
can be fulfilled. 
Most people would agree that moral praise and blame of  the 
kind involved when we “hold a person responsible” have a force 
which goes beyond the merely informational function of  “telling 
people what people are like.”  The problem  for a compatibilist 
is  to  show  that  judgments with  this  “additional  force”  can  be 
appropriate even if  the Causal Thesis is true.  The prior problem 
for moral theory is to say what this “additional force” is.  What is 
it that an account of  moral judgment must capture in order to be 
successfully “compatibilist”?
As I have said, Smart’s analysis is not compatibilist.  His aim 
is to replace ordinary moral judgment, not to analyze it.  Strawson, 
on the other hand, is offering a compatibilist analysis of  (at least 
some kinds of) moral judgment, and his analysis clearly satisfies 
one-half of  the compatibilist test.  The expression of interpersonal 
reactive  attitudes is compatible with the Causal Thesis for much 
the same reason  that Smart’s notions of  praise and dispraise are. 
These attitudes are reactions to “what people are like,” as this is 
shown in their  actions.  As long as the people in question really 
are like this —   as long, that is, as their actions really do manifest 
the attitudes in question —these reactive attitudes are appropriate. 
Strawson’s theory  is  more appealing than Smart’s because  it 
offers  a  plausible  account  of  moral  judgment  as  we  currently 
understand  it,  an account  of  how  moral  judgment  goes  beyond 
merely  “saying what people are like” and of  how it differs from 
mere attempts to influence behavior.  But his theory is like Smart’s 
in  locating  the  “special  force”  of  moral  judgment  in what the 
moral judge is doing.  The contractualist  account I  am offering, 
on the other hand, locates the origin of  this distinctive force in 
what is claimed about the person judged.  It is quite compatible 
with this analysis that moral judgments should often be intended 
to  influence  behavior  and  that  they  should  often  be  made  as 
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intent is not essential.  What is essential, on this account, is that a 
judgment of  moral blame asserts that the way in which an agent 
decided what to do was not in accord with standards which that 
agent either accepts or should accept insofar as he or she is con- 
cerned to justify his or her actions to others on grounds that they 
could  not reasonably  reject.  This is  description,  but given  that 
most people care about the justifiability of  their actions to others, 
it is not mere description. 
This account of  the special force of  moral judgment may still 
seem inadequate.  Given what I have said it may seem that, on the 
contractualist view, this special force lies simply in the fact that 
moral  judgments  attribute  to  an  agent  properties  which  most 
people are seriously concerned to have or to avoid.  In this respect 
moral judgments are like judgments of beauty or intelligence.  But 
these forms of appraisal, and the pride and shame that can go with 
accepting them, involve no attribution of  responsibility and hence 
raise no question of  freedom.  To the extent that moral appraisal 
is different in this respect, and does raise a special question of  free- 
dom, it would seem that this difference is yet to be accounted for. 
One way in which freedom is relevant to moral appraisal on 
the Quality of  Will theory  (the main way mentioned so far)  is 
this: insofar as we are talking about praising or blaming a person 
on the basis of  a particular  action, the freedom or unfreedom of 
that action is relevant to the question whether the intentions and 
attitudes seemingly implicit in it are actually present in the agent. 
This  evidential  relevance  of  freedom  is  not  peculiar  to  moral 
appraisal, however.  Similar questions can arise in regard to assess- 
ments of  intelligence or skill on the basis of  particular pieces of 
behavior. (We may ask, for example, whether the occasion was 
a fair test  of  her  skill, or whether  there were interfering condi- 
tions.)  The objection just  raised  does not dispute the ability of 
the Quality  of  Will theory  to explain  this  way in which  moral 
judgments may  depend on questions of  freedom, but it suggests 
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and attitudes  are correctly attributed  to  an  agent  and then  asks 
how, on the analysis I have offered, this attribution goes beyond 
welcome or unwelcome description.  Behind the objection lies the 
idea that going “beyond description” in the relevant sense would 
involve  holding the  agent  responsible in  a way  that people  are 
not  (normally)  responsible for being beautiful or intelligent and 
that this notion of  responsibility brings with it a further condition 
of freedom which my discussion of  the Quality of Will theory has 
so far ignored. 
I do not believe that in order to criticize a person for behaving 
in a vicious and callous manner we must maintain that he or she 
is responsible for becoming vicious and callous.  Whether a person 
is so responsible is, in my view, a separate question.  Leaving this 
question aside, however, there is a sense in which we are respon- 
sible for — or, I would prefer to say, accountable for — our inten- 
tions  and decisions but not for our looks or intelligence.  This is 
just because, insofar as these intentions and decisions are ours, 
it is appropriate to ask us to justify or explain them —  appropriate, 
that is, for someone to ask, Why do you think you can treat me 
this way? in a way that it would not be appropriate to ask, in an 
accusing tone, Why are you so tall? This is not to say that these 
mental states are the kinds of thing which have reasons rather than 
causes but only that they are states for which requests for reasons 
are in principle relevant. 
Moral  criticism  and  moral  argument,  on  the  contractualist 
view, consist in  the exchange of  such requests  and justifications. 
Adverse moral judgment  therefore  differs from mere unwelcome 
description  because it calls for particular kinds of  response, such 
as justification, explanation, or admission of  fault.  In what way 
does it “call for” these responses?  Here let me make three points. 
First,  the  person  making  an  adverse  moral  judgment  is  often 
literally asking for or demanding an explanation, justification, or 
apology.  Second, moral  criticism concerns features of  the agent 
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self, are appropriate.  Insofar as I think of  a past intention, deci- 
sion,  or  action  as  mine,  I  think  of  it as  something which  was 
sensitive to my  assessment, at the time, of  relevant reasons.  This 
makes it appropriate for me to ask myself, Why did I think or do 
that? and Do I still take those reasons to be sufficient?  Third, the 
contractualist account  of  moral motivation ties these  two points 
together.  A person who is concerned to be able to justify him- or 
herself to others will be moved to respond to the kind of  demand 
I have mentioned, will want to be able to respond positively (i.e., 
with  a justification)  and will want to carry out the kind of  first- 
person reflection just described in a way that makes such a response 
possible.  For  such a person, moral blame differs from mere un- 
welcome description  not only because of  its seriousness but also 
because it engages in this way with an agent’s own process of criti- 
cal reflection, thus raising the questions Why did I do that?  Do I 
still endorse those reasons?  Can I defend the judgment that they 
were adequate grounds for acting? 
Whether one accepts this as an adequate account of  the “spe- 
cial force” of  moral judgments will  depend, of  course, on what 
one thinks that moral judgment in the “ordinary” sense actually 
entails.  Some have held that from the fact that a person is morally 
blameworthy it follows that it would be a good thing if he or she 
were to suffer some harm (or, at least, that this would be less bad 
than if some innocent person were to suffer the same harm).I8 I 
do not myself  regard moral blame as having this implication.  So 
if  a compatibilist  account of  moral judgment must have this con- 
sequence, I  am content to be offering a revisionist theory.  (The 
problem  of  how  the  fact  of  choice  may  make  harmful  con- 
sequences  more  justifiable  will,  however,  come  up  again  in 
lecture 2.) 
18This idea was suggested to me by Derek Parfit in the seminar following the 
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7. BLAMEWORTHINESS AND FREEDOM
It remains to say something about how this contractualist ver- 
sion of  the Quality of  Will theory handles the difficult question 
of  moral  appraisal of  the insane.  Discussion  of  this matter will 
also enable me to draw together some of  the points that have just 
been  made and to say more about the kind of  freedom which  is 
presupposed  by  moral  blameworthiness  according to  the theory 
I have been proposing. 
As  I  said  earlier, to  believe  that  one’s behavior  is  morally 
faulty  is  to believe  either that one has  failed to  attend to con- 
siderations which  any standards that others could not reasonably 
reject would require one to attend to or that one has knowingly 
acted contrary to what such standards would require.  Let me focus 
for a moment on the first disjunct.  Something like this is a neces- 
sary part of  an account of  moral blameworthiness,  since failure 
to give any thought at all to what is morally required can certainly 
be grounds for moral criticism.  But the purely negative statement 
I have given above is too broad.  The class of people who simply 
fail to attend to the relevant considerations includes many who do 
not seem to be candidates for moral blame: people acting in their 
sleep, victims of  hypnosis, young children, people suffering from 
mental illness, and so on.  We  need to find, within the notion of 
moral blame itself, some basis for a nonarbitrary qualification of 
the purely negative criterion. 
According to contractualism, thought about right and wrong is 
a  search  for  principles  “for  the regulation of  behavior”  which 
others, similarly motivated, have reason to accept.  What kind of 
“regulation”  is  intended  here?  Not regulation  “from without” 
through a system of  social sanctions but regulation “from within” 
through critical reflection on one’s own conduct under the pressure 
provided by  the desire to be able to justify one actions to others on 
grounds they could not reasonably reject.  This idea of  regulation 
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specifically moral component is the ability to reason  about what 
could be justified to others.  The nonmoral component is the more 
general capacity through which the results of such reasoning make 
a difference  to what one does.  Let me call this the capacity for 
critically  reflective,  rational  self-governance —   “critically  reflec- 
tive’’ because it involves the ability to reflect and pass judgment 
upon one’s actions and the thought processes leading up to them; 
“rational”  in  the broad  sense of  involving sensitivity to reasons 
and the ability  to weigh  them; “self-governance” because it is  a 
process which makes a difference to how one acts. 
The critical reflection of  a person who has this capacity will 
have a kind of  coherence over time.  Conclusions reached at one 
time will be  seen  as relevant  to critical  reflection  at later times 
unless specifically overruled.  In addition, the results of  this reflec- 
tion will normally make a difference both in how the person acts 
given  a certain perception  of  a situation  and in  the features of 
situations which he or she is on the alert for and tends to notice. 
This  general  capacity  for  critically  reflective,  rational  self- 
governance is not specifically moral, and someone could have it 
who was  entirely unconcerned with morality.  Morality  does not 
tell one to have this capacity, and failing to have it in general or 
on a particular occasion is not a moral fault.  Rather, morality is 
addressed to people who are assumed to have this general capacity, 
and it tells them how the capacity should be exercised.  The most 
general moral  demand is that we exercise our capacity for self- 
governance in ways that others could reasonably  be  expected to 
authorize.  More  specific  moral  requirements  follow  from  this. 
Since  moral  blameworthiness  concerns  the  exercise  of  the 
general capacity of  self-governance, our views about the limits of 
moral blame are sensitive to changes in our views about the limits 
of  this  capacity.  We  normally  believe,  for  example,  that  very 
young children lack this capacity and that it does not govern our 
actions while we are asleep.  Nor, according to some assumptions 
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generally believed to be blocked by  some forms of mental illness. 
These assumptions could be wrong, but given that we hold them 
it is natural that we do not take people in these categories to be 
morally blameworthy for their  actions.  (Whether we think it is 
useful  to blame  them  is of  course  another question.)  It is  im- 
portant  to  our  reactions  in  such  cases,  however,  that  what  is 
impaired  or  suspended  is  a general  capacity for critically  reflec- 
tive, rational self-governance. If what is “lost” is more specifically 
moral — if, for example, a person lacks any concern for the wel- 
fare of others — then the result begins to look more like a species 
of moral fault. 
As a “higher order” capacity, the capacity for critically reflec- 
tive,  rational  self-governance  has  an  obvious  similarity  to  the 
capacities for higher-order desires and judgments which figure in 
the analyses of  personhood and freedom offered by  Harry Frank- 
furt and others.19 I have been led to this capacity, however, not 
through an analysis of general notions of freedom and personhood 
but rather through reflection on the nature of moral argument and 
moral judgment.  Basic to morality as I understand it is an idea of 
agreement between  individuals qua critics and regulators of  their 
own  actions  and  deliberative  processes.  Critically  reflective,  ra- 
tional self-governance is a capacity which  is required in order for 
that idea not to be  an idle one.  It follows that moral criticism 
is restricted to individuals who have this capacity and to actions 
which fall within its scope.20 
19See Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” 
Journal  of  Philosophy  68  (1971):  5-20;  Wright  Neely,  “Freedom and  Desire,” 
Philosophical  Review  83 (1974) : 32-54;  and Gary Watson, “Free Agency,” Journal 
of  Philosophy  72 (1975) :  205-20. 
20The idea that moral criticism is applicable only to actions which are within 
the  scope  of  a  capacity  of  self-governance which  normally  makes  a  difference in 
what  a  person  does marks  a point  of  tangency between  the  Influenceability theory 
and the analysis I  am offering.  I am not suggesting, however, that particular acts of 
moral  criticism  are aimed  at  influencing  people or  that  moral  criticism  is  always 
inappropriate when  there  is  no hope of  its making any difference to what people 
do.  Morality  as I  am describing it is  in a general sense “action guiding” — moral 
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In Frankfurt’s terms, these restrictions correspond roughly to a 
restriction to persons (as opposed to “wantons”) and a restriction 
to actions which are performed freely.  In my view, however, this 
last  characterization  is  not  entirely  apt.  Aside  from  external 
impediments  to  bodily  motion, what  is  required  for  moral  ap- 
praisal  on the view  I  am presenting is the “freedom,” whatever 
it may be, which  is required  by  critically reflective, rational self- 
governance.  But this is less appropriately thought of  as a kind of 
freedom than as a kind of  intrapersonal responsiveness.  What is 
required  is  that  what  we  do be  importantly  dependent  on our 
process of  critical reflection, that that process itself  be sensitive to 
reasons,  and that  later  stages of  the process be  importantly de- 
pendent on conclusions reached  at earlier stages.  But there is no 
reason, as far as I can see, to require that this process itself not 
be a causal product of  antecedent events and conditions.’’  Calling 
the relevant  condition  a form of  freedom suggests this  require- 
ment, but this suggestion is undermined by  our investigation into 
the moral significance of choice. 
8. CONCLUSION 
The contractualist version of the Quality of Will theory which 
I have described seems to me to provide a satisfactory explanation 
of  the significance of  choice for the moral  appraisal of  agents. 
“ought” judgments need  not be  intended as  action guiding, and  insofar as  they do 
guide action they need not do so by  being prescriptive in form.  Rather,  they guide 
action  by  calling attention  to  facts  about the justifiability  of  actions — facts which 
morally  concerned agents  care about.  In these respects my view differs  from R. M. 
Hare’s prescriptivism, though  we  would  say  some  of  the  same  things  about  free 
will.  See  his  “Prediction  and  Moral  Appraisal,”  in  P. French, T.  Uehling,  and 
H.  Wettstein,  eds.,  Midwest  Studies  in  Philosophy,  vol.  III  (Minneapolis:  Uni- 
versity of  Minnesota Press, 1978), pp. 17-27. 
21For more extended discussion of this issue, see Daniel Dennett’s Elbow Room 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,  1984), especially chs. 3-5.  I make no  claim to be 
advancing beyond what  other compatibilists  have said about the nature of  delibera- 
tion  and  action.  My  concern is  with  the  question of  moral responsibility.  Here I 
differ  with  Dennett, who  goes  much  further  than  I  would  toward  accepting  the 
Influenceability  theory.  See ch. 7 of  Elbow  Room  and  Gary Watson’s criticisms of 
it in his review in Journal  of Philosophy  83 (1986): 517-22. 
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This theory  offers  a convincing and unified  account  of  familiar 
excusing  conditions,  such  as  mistake  of  fact  and  duress,  and 
explains our reactions  to questions about moral appraisal of  very 
young children, the insane, and victims of hypnosis.  It can explain 
the special critical force which moral judgments seem to have, and 
it does this without presupposing a form of  freedom incompatible 
with  the Causal  Thesis.  But  the  theory  applies only to what I 
called  earlier  the  moral  version  of  the  free-will  problem.  A 
parallel account may, as I will suggest later, have some relevance 
to the case of  criminal punishment, but it does not offer a promis- 
ing approach  to  the other problems I have mentioned.  The sig- 
nificance of  a person’s choices and other subjective responses for 
questions of  economic justice  and freedom of  thought may have 
something  to  do  with  the  fact  that  these  responses  reflect  what
might loosely be called “the quality of  the person’s will,” but this 
is not because what we are doing in these cases is judging this
“quality” or expressing attitudes toward it (since this is not what 
we are doing.)  So, in search of  an explanation that might cover 
these other cases, I will look in a different direction. 
Lecture 2 
1. THE VALUE OF CHOICE 
It would have been natural to call these lectures an investiga- 
tion  into  the  significance  of  voluntariness.  I  have  spoken  of 
“choice” instead because this term applies not only to something 
that an agent does — as in “She made a choice” — but also to 
what an agent is presented with — as in “She was faced with this 
choice.”  It thus encompasses both an action and a situation within 
which  such  an  action  determines  what  will  happen:  a  set  of 
alternatives, their relative desirabilities, the information available 
to the agent, and so on. My main concern in these lectures is with 
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significance of  the choices people make.  In this lecture, however, 
I  will present  a  theory  which  exploits  the  ambiguity  just  men- 
tioned by  seeking to explain one kind of moral significance of  the 
choices people make in terms of the value of  the choices they have. 
I will call this the Value of Choice theory.22
This theory starts from the idea that it is often a good thing 
for a person  to have what will happen depend upon how he or 
she responds when presented with the alternatives under the right 
conditions.  To take a banal example, when I go to a restaurant, it 
is  generally a good thing from my  point of  view  to have what 
appears on my  plate depend on the way in which I respond when 
presented with the menu.  The most  obvious reason why choice 
has value for me in this situation is simply instrumental: I would 
like what appears on my plate to conform to my preferences at the 
time it appears, and I believe that if what appears then is made to 
depend on my response when faced with the menu then the result 
is likely to coincide with what I want.  This reason  for valuing 
choice is both conditional and relative.  It is conditional in that the 
value of  my  response as a predictor of  future satisfaction depends 
on the nature of  the question and the conditions under which my 
response  is  elicited.  It is relative in that it depends on the reli- 
ability  of  the  available alternative  means  for  selecting  the out- 
comes in question.  In the restaurant  case this value depends on 
how much I know about the cuisine in question and on my  condi- 
tion at the time the menu arrives: on whether I am drunk or over- 
eager  to impress my  companions  with my  knowledge of  French 
22As I have said, the basic idea of this theory was presented by Hart in “Legal 
Responsibility  and  Excuses.”  Since Hart’s article others have  written  in  a  similar 
vein, although they have been concerned mainly with the theory of punishment.  See, 
for example,  John  Mackie,  “The  Grounds of  Responsibility,”  in P.  M.  S.  Hacker 
and  J.  Raz,  eds.,  Law,  Morality,  and  Society:  Essays  in  Honour  of  H.  L.  A.  Hart, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press,  1977), and  C. S. Nino,  “A Consensual Theory 
of  Punishment,”  Philosophy  and  Public  Affairs  12 (1983) :  289-306.  Like  Hart, 
Nino links the significance of  choice  (in his terms,  consent) as a condition of  just 
punishment  with  its  significance elsewhere in  the  law, e.g., in  contracts and  torts. 
His  view  of  this  significance, however,  is  closer  than  my  own  to  what  I  refer  to 
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or my  ability  to swallow  highly  seasoned  food.  Thus the same 
interest which  sometimes makes choice valuable —the desire that 
outcomes  should coincide  with  one’s preferences — can at other 
times provide reasons for wanting outcomes to be determined in 
some  other  way,  When I  go  to  an exotic  restaurant  with  my 
sophisticated friends, the chances of  getting a meal that accords 
with my preferences may  be  increased if  someone else does the 
ordering. 
What I  have  described  so  far is  what might be  called  the 
“predictive”  or  “instrumental”  value of  choice.  In the example 
I have given, choice is instrumental to my own future enjoyment, 
but the class of states which one might seek to advance by making 
outcomes dependent on choices is of  course much broader.  Aside 
from such instrumental values, however, there are other ways in 
which  having outcomes  depend on my  choice can have positive 
or negative value for me.  One of these, which I will call “demon- 
strative” value, can be illustrated as follows.  On our anniversary, 
I want not only to have  a present  for my  wife but also to have 
chosen that present myself.  This is not because I think this process 
is the one best calculated to produce a present she will  like  (for 
that, it would be better to let her choose the present herself).  The 
reason, rather, is that the gift will have special meaning if  I choose 
it —if it reflects my feelings about her and my thoughts about the 
occasion.  On other occasions, for reasons similar in character but 
opposite in sign, I might prefer  that outcomes not be  dependent 
on my choices.  For example, I might prefer to have the question 
of who will get a certain job (my friend or a stranger) not depend 
on how I respond when presented with the choice: I want it to be 
clear  that the outcome need not reflect my judgment of  their re- 
spective merits or my balancing of the competing claims of  merit 
and loyalty. 
The features of  oneself  which  one may desire to demonstrate 
or see realized in action are highly varied.  They may include the 
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awareness,  or memory, or one’s imagination and skill.  Many of 
these are involved in the example cited: I want to make the choice 
myself because the result will then indicate the importance I attach 
to the occasion (my willingness to devote time to choosing a gift); 
my  memory of, attention to, and concern for what she likes; as 
well  as my  imagination  and skill in coming up with  an unusual 
and amusing gift.  The desire to see such features of oneself mani- 
fested in actions and outcomes is of  course not limited to cases in 
which  one’s feelings  for another person  are at issue.  I want to 
choose the furniture for my own apartment, pick out the pictures 
for the walls, and even write my own lectures despite the fact that 
these things  might be  done better  by  a decorator, art expert, or 
talented graduate student. For better or worse, I want these things 
to  be  produced  by  and reflect  my  own  taste,  imagination,  and 
powers of  discrimination and analysis.  I feel the same way, even 
more  strongly,  about  important  decisions  affecting  my  life  in 
larger terms: what career to follow, where to work, how to live. 
These last examples, however,  may  involve not only demon- 
strative but also what I will call “symbolic” value.  In a situation 
in which people are normally expected to determine outcomes of 
a certain sort through their own choices unless they are not compe- 
tent to do so, I may value having a choice because my not having 
it would reflect a judgment on my own or someone else’s part that 
I fell below the expected standard of  competence.  Thus, while I 
might  like  to  have  the  advantage  of  my  sophisticated  friends’ 
expertise when the menu arrives tonight, I might prefer, all things 
considered, to order for myself, in order to avoid public acknowl- 
edgment  of  my  relative  ignorance  of  food, wine,  and  foreign 
cultures. 
I  make  no  claim  that  these  three  categories  of  value  are 
mutually exclusive or that, taken together, they exhaust the forms 
of  value that choice can have.  My aim in distinguishing them is 
simply to illustrate the value that choice can have and to make 
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people have for wanting outcomes to be (or sometimes not to be) 
dependent on their  choices has  to  do with  the significance that 
choice itself has for them, not merely with its efficacy in promoting 
outcomes which are desired on other grounds. 
The three forms of  value which I have distinguished (predic- 
tive,  demonstrative,  and  symbolic)  would  all  figure  in  a  full 
account  of  the  problem  of  paternalism.  Legal  restriction  of 
people’s freedom “for their own good” is likely to seem justified 
where  (a)  people who make a certain choice are likely to suffer 
very  serious loss;  (b)  the instrumental value of  choice as a way 
of  warding off  this  loss is, given  the circumstances under which 
that  choice  would  be  exercised,  seriously undermined;  (c)  the 
demonstrative value that would be lost by  being deprived of  this 
choice  is  minimal;  and  (d)  the  tendency  to  “make the wrong 
choice” under  the circumstances in question  is widely  shared, so 
that no particular group is being held inferior in the argument for 
legal  regulation.  The pejorative  ring of  “paternalism” and the 
particular  bitterness  attaching  to  it  stem  from  cases  in  which 
either the seriousness of  the loss in question or the foolishness of 
the choice leading to it is a matter of controversy.  Those who are 
inclined  to  make a  particular choice may  not see it as mistaken 
and may attach demonstrative value to it.  Consequently, they may 
resent  paternalistic  legislation,  which  brands  them  as  less  than 
fully competent when, in their view, they merely differ from the 
majority in the things they value.  But this kind of resentment need 
not properly extend to other kinds of  legislation sometimes called 
“paternalistic,” such as wage and hour laws. Whether there is any 
reason at all for such resentment will depend on the reasons sup- 
porting  a  piece  of  legislation  and  also  on  the  reasons  people 
actually  have  for  valuing  freedom  of  choice which  they would 
lose. 
As  controversies  about paternalism  illustrate, people can dis- 
agree sharply about the value of particular choices. They disagree, 
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a  seat belt  depend  on how  one reacts  (in the  absence  of  any 
coercion) when setting off  in a car.  Some regard it as a significant 
loss when some form of  coercion or even mild duress (the threat 
of  a  fine, or even  the monitory  presence  of  a  brief  buzzer)  is 
introduced.  Others, like me, regard this loss as trivial, and see the 
“constrained” choice as  significantly more valuable  than  the un- 
constrained  one.  This disagreement reflects differences in the in- 
strumental, demonstrative, and symbolic value we attach to these 
choices. 
The existence of  such differences raises  the question of  what 
is to count  as “the value” of  a choice as I have been using this 
phrase.  One possibility is  what I  will call  “fully individualized 
value.” This is the value of the choice to a particular individual, 
taking into account the importance that individual attaches to hav- 
ing particular  alternatives  available, the difference that it makes 
to that individual which of these alternatives actually occurs, the 
importance which the individual attaches to having this be deter-
mined by  his or her reactions, and the skill and discernment with 
which that individual will choose under the conditions in question. 
This fully individualized value may not be the same as the value 
which  the individual actually  assigns to the choice in  question; 
rather, it is the ex ante value which he or she should  assign given 
his or her values and propensities. 
Fully  individualized  value  is  not  what  normally  figures  in 
moral argument, however.  Appeals to the value of choice arise in 
moral  argument chiefly when we are  appraising  moral principles 
or social institutions rather than when we are discussing particular 
choices  by  specific  individuals.  In  these  contexts  we  have  to 
answer such general questions as How important is it to have the 
selection among these alternatives depend on one’s choice?  How 
bad a thing is it to have to choose under these conditions? When 
we  address  these  questions, fully  individualized  values  are not 
known.  We argue instead in terms of  what might be called the 
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categories of  choice which we take to be a fair starting point for 
justification.  Thus, for example, we take it as given for purposes 
of  moral  argument that it is very important that what one wears 
and whom one lives with be dependent on one’s choices and much 
less important that one be able to choose what other people wear, 
what they eat, and how they live.  And we do this despite the fact 
that there may be some who would not agree with this assignment 
of values. 
This phenomenon —   the use in moral argument of  nonunani- 
mously  held  “normalized” standards of  value — is  familiar and 
by  no means limited to the case of  choice.  The status and justifica- 
tion  of  such  standards is  a difficult problem  in moral  theory.  I 
will not address the general question here but will mention briefly 
two  points  about  the case  of  choice.  First,  “giving people  the 
choice” —   for example, the opportunity to transfer goods through 
market trading — is one way to deal with the problem of divergent 
individual preferences.  What has just been indicated, however, is 
that  it  is  at best  a partial solution.  “Having a choice”  among 
specified  alternatives  under specified conditions  is  itself  a good 
which  individuals  may  value  differently  —  as  is  “having  the  
choice whether to have the choice” and so on.23 Second, differences 
in individualized valuations  of  choices result not only from dif- 
ferences  in  preference  but  also  from  differences  in  the  personal 
characteristics  which make a choice valuable: differences in fore- 
sight,  in  self-control,  in  self-understanding,  and  so  on.  Moral 
argument commonly refers to “normal” levels of  these capacities 
as well as to “normal” valuations of outcomes and of  demonstra- 
tive and symbolic values. 
Let me turn now to the question of  how the value of  choice 
is  related  to  the Quality of  Will theory,  discussed above.  Like 
23The variability of the value of choice is pointed out clearly by Gerald 
Dworkin  in  “Is  More  Choice  Better  Than  Less?”  in  P.  French,  T.  Uehling,  and  U
H. Wettstein, eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. VII (Minneapolis: Univer- 
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what I  have here called  predictive and demonstrative value, the 
form of  appraisal underlying  the Quality of  Will theory  starts 
from the obvious  fact  that  subjective responses  can  indicate  or 
express  continuing  features  of  a  person  and  from the equally 
obvious fact that these responses are better indicators under some 
conditions than under others.  Even in this common starting point, 
however,  there  is  a  difference:  the features of  the person  with 
which the Quality of Will theory is concerned constitute a narrow 
subset of  those that give choice its value for the agent.  For  ex- 
ample, I want to choose my own food largely because my choices 
will be good indicators of what will please me, but my being pleased 
more by  fish  than by  liver  is not part of  the quality of  my  will 
with which moral judgment is concerned. 
Where the two  theories differ  most importantly, however, is 
in the way in which they assign  moral significance to this indica- 
tive aspect of  choice.  The Quality of  Will theory takes the point 
of view of  the moral judge.  Variations in the indicative value of 
subjective responses are significant from this point of view because 
moral judgment involves an inference from behavior to quality of 
will.  The Value of  Choice theory, on the other hand, begins with 
the value for  an  agent of  having outcomes  depend  (or not de- 
pend) on his or her subjective responses under certain conditions. 
This  (so  far purely personal)  value takes on moral significance 
by being the basis for a claim against social institutions (or against 
other individuals).  In my view, to show that a social institution 
is legitimate one must show that it can be justified to each person 
affected by  it on grounds which that person  could not reasonably 
reject.  One thing which people may reasonably demand, however, 
is the ability to shape their lives and obligations through the exer- 
cise of  choice under reasonably favorable conditions.  Moral prin- 
ciples  or social institutions which  deny such  opportunities when 
they  could  easily be  provided, or which  force one to accept the 
consequences  of  choice  under  extremely  unfavorable  conditions 
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to be  reasonably  rejectable for that reason.  Let me illustrate by 
considering some examples. 
2. JUSTICE AND CHOICE
Consider first the economic justice example which I mentioned 
earlier,  Suppose a  society, not  marked  by  significant  economic 
inequalities, decides that it needs to have a significant proportion 
of  its workforce work overtime  at a particular job.  To this end, 
a bonus is offered to anyone willing to undertake the work, at an 
amount calculated to elicit the required number of volunteers. The 
choice  between  extra  pay  and extra  leisure  has obvious  instru- 
mental  value  for  the  people  involved,  and giving  people  this 
choice makes it overwhelmingly likely that those who prefer addi- 
tional income (with additional labor) will get it, while those who 
prefer the opposite will get what they prefer.  If  overtime work 
was not made dependent on choice the scheme would be very dif- 
ficult  to  justify; with  this  feature,  justification  is  much  easier. 
Nonetheless, whether  or not  a  given worker  winds  up  among 
those with extra pay will no doubt depend on some “morally arbi- 
trary” facts about his or her background.  Why then is this situa- 
tion any better than the one criticized by Rawls? 
The difference does not lie in the “fact” that the choices made 
in one case have causal antecedents while those made in the other 
case do not.  In the egalitarian case, however, we can say that by 
placing  the  people  in  those  circumstances,  offering  them  that 
choice, and letting the outcome be determined by  the choice they 
make under those conditions, we have done as much for them as 
could reasonably  be required.  In the other case it may be argued 
that we cannot  say this: once the people are placed in disadvan- 
tageous  circumstances,  circumstances  which  themselves  make  it 
very  unlikely  that  anyone  would  make  the choices necessary  to 
escape, offering these people the opportunity to exert themselves 
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The background conditions under which  choices are made in 
the laissez-faire system are “arbitrary from a moral point of  view” 
in this sense: they could be almost anything.  All we know is that 
they  will  be  conditions which  arose  from a  series of  voluntary 
transactions,  and  this  does  nothing  to  ensure  that  they  will  be 
good conditions under which to choose.  Consequently, there is no 
assurance  that these conditions will  have the moral property  of 
being  conditions under which  choices confer legitimacy on their 
outcomes. 
This  interpretation  of  Rawls’s  objection  to  the  laissez-faire 
“system of  natural liberty” provides the basis for a reply to one 
line of  criticism raised  by  Nozick  and others.  Nozick interprets 
Rawls as arguing that the fact that some people exert themselves, 
take  risks,  and excel while others do not do so cannot by  itself 
justify  different  economic  rewards  for  the  two  groups  because 
these differences in motivation may be the result of  causal factors 
outside the control of  the agents themselves.  He goes on to object 
that 
this line of  argument can succeed in blocking the introduction 
of  a person’s  autonomous choices and actions  (and their  re- 
sults) only by  attributing everything noteworthy about the per- 
son  completely  to  certain  sorts  of  “external”  factors.  So
denigrating a person’s autonomy and prime responsibility  for 
his actions is a risky  line to take for a theory that founds so 
much (including a theory of the good) upon persons’ choices.24
The problem  which  Nozick  raises  here  is  a  version  of  the 
“political problem  of  free will” as I presented it in my  first lec- 
ture.  My reply  (I do not claim that this was also Rawls’s inten- 
tion)  is  that it is not mere  attributability  to “external”  factors 
that undermines the legitimating force of  the choices in a “system 
of  natural  liberty.”  The problem,  rather, is that such  a  system 
24Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 
p. 214. [SCANLON]      The Significance of Choice                                            187
provides  no assurance  that these factors  will not be ones which 
undermine  the value  of  choice  for many people  in the  society. 
Suppose that  I  exert  myself  to  develop my  talents  and become 
wealthy.  You,  on  the  other  hand,  suffering  the  psychological 
effects of your unfortunate  starting position, fail to exert yourself, 
and as  a consequence remain poor.  Can I “claim  credit” for my 
initiative and perseverance, given that they resulted  from “fortu- 
nate family and social circumstances for which  [I]  can claim no 
credit”?25  If  to  “claim  credit”  means  simply  to  consider  these 
traits and actions  “mine” in the sense required  in order to  take 
pride in them, then the answer is clearly yes. My accomplishments 
reflect personal qualities which I really do have.  If, however, what 
is meant is that these differences in our behavior  can be taken to 
justify  my  having  more income  and your  having  less,  then  the 
answer may be no.  This is not because my actions, being caused 
by  outside factors, are not “mine,”  or because your  actions, simi- 
larly caused by  other factors, are therefore not “yours,” but rather 
because presenting a person with a choice of  the kind you had is 
not doing enough for that person. 
Of  course, Rawls and Nozick  disagree over what constitutes 
“doing enough” for a person.  For Nozick, one has “done enough” 
as  long as  the person’s Lockean  rights have not been  violated; 
for Rawls, the standard is  set by  the principles which  would be 
accepted  behind the Veil of  Ignorance.  As  a  result, Rawls’s re- 
marks about  “factors arbitrary from a moral point of  view,” as I 
have  interpreted  them,  may  seem  not  to  advance  his argument 
against  Notick  but  merely  to  restate  the disagreement  between 
them.  But  this restatement  seems to  me to have several virtues. 
First,  it  locates  the  disagreement  in what  seems,  intuitively, to 
be the right place — in a question of justice rather than in a sepa- 
rate  (and I  believe  spurious)  question of  causal  determination. 
Second, framing the argument in terms of the value of choice has 
25Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 104; quoted by Nozick, Anarchy, State, and 
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the  effect  of  disentangling  the  idea  of  individual  liberty  from 
Nozick’s particular  system of  Lockean rights.  This allows oppo- 
nents of  that system to make clear that they, too, value individual 
choice and liberty  and gives them a chance to put forward their 
alternative interpretations of  these values.  The argument can then 
proceed as a debate about the merits of  competing interpretations 
of  the moral  significance of  liberty  and choice rather than as a 
clash between defenders of  liberty and proponents of  equality or 
some other pattern of distribution. 
The Value of Choice theory represents a general philosophical 
strategy which  is  common to Hart’s analysis of  punishment  and 
Rawls’s theory of  distributive justice as I have just interpreted it. 
In approaching  the  problems  of  justifying both  penal  and eco- 
nomic institutions we begin with strong pretheoretical intuitions 
about the significance of  choice : voluntary  and intentional  com- 
mission of  a criminal act is a necessary condition of  just punish- 
ment, and voluntary economic contribution can make an economic 
reward just  and its denial unjust.  One way to account for these 
intuitions is by  appeal to a preinstitutional  notion of  desert: cer- 
tain acts deserve punishment, certain contributions merit rewards, 
and institutions are just if  they distribute benefits and burdens in 
accord with these forms of desert. 
The strategy I  am describing makes a point of  avoiding any 
such appeal.  The only notions of  desert which it recognizes are 
internal  to  institutions  and  dependent  upon  a  prior  notion  of 
justice: if institutions are just then people deserve the rewards and 
punishments which those institutions assign them.  In the justifica- 
tion of  institutions, the notion of  desert  is  replaced  by  an inde- 
pendent notion  of  justice;  in  the justification  of  specific actions 
and outcomes  it  is  replaced  by  the  idea  of  legitimate  (institu- 
tionally defined) expectations.26 
In order for this strategy to succeed, the conception of justice 
by which  institutions are to be judged must adequately  represent 
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our intuitions about the significance of choice without falling back 
on a preinstitutional concept of  desert.  This is where the idea of 
the value  of  choice comes in.  Just  institutions must  make out- 
comes depend on individuals’ choices because of  the importance 
which individuals reasonably attach to this dependence.  But there 
is a serious question whether this strategy can account for the dis- 
tinctive  importance  which  choice  appears  to  have.  Insofar  as 
choice-dependence  is merely one form of  individual good among 
others, it may seem that the Value of Choice theory will be unable 
to explain  our intuition that the moral requirement  that certain 
outcomes be made dependent on people’s choices is not to be sacri- 
ficed  for  the  sake  of  increases  in  efficiency,  security,  or  other 
benefits. 
Several defenses can be offered against this charge.  The first 
is to point out the distinctiveness of  the value of  choice as com- 
pared with other elements in a person’s welfare.  As I have indi- 
cated above, the value of choice is not a purely instrumental value. 
People reasonably attach intrinsic significance to having outcomes 
depend  on  their  choices.  In  addition,  the  moral  requirements 
which this value gives rise to within a contractualist moral theory 
are not corollaries of  a more general duty to look out for people’s 
welfare. In fact, the demand to make outcomes depend on people’s 
choices and the demand to promote their welfare are quite inde- 
pendent, and they can often pull in opposite directions. 
A  second  defense  —  parallel  to  Rawls’s  argument  for  the 
priority of  liberty — is to argue that in appraising social institu- 
tions  people  would  reasonably  set  a particularly  high  value on 
having certain kinds of outcomes be dependent on their choices.27 
A  third, more pragmatic defense is to argue that the distinctive 
significance which choice appears to have is in part an artifact of 
the position  from which we typically view it.  This is a position 
internal  to  institutions,  and  one  in which  choices  have  special 
salience because they are the last justifying elements to enter the 
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picture.  When the relevant background is in place — when condi- 
tions are right, necessary safeguards have been provided, and so 
on — the fact that a person chooses a certain outcome may make 
that outcome one that he or she cannot reasonably  complain of. 
But choice has this effect only when these other factors are present. 
Because they are relatively fixed features of the environment, these 
background conditions are less noticeable than the actions of  the 
main actors in the drama, but this does not mean that they are less 
impor  tan  t. 
These defenses are most convincing in those cases in which the 
first  argument  is  strongest — that is, in cases  like the economic 
justice example just  discussed, in which  people’s desire to shape 
their  own  lives  gives  choice  an important,  positive  value.  The 
Value of  Choice theory looks weaker in cases where the only rea- 
son for wanting to have a choice is that it makes certain unwanted 
outcomes  (such  as punishment)  less likely.  Here choice has no 
positive value — rather than have the choice, one would prefer to 
eliminate these  outcomes altogether  if  that were  possible — yet 
the fact  of  choice  seems  to  retain  its  special  significance  as  a 
justifying condition. Let me turn, then, to an example of this kind. 
3. CHOICE AND PROTECTION
Suppose that  we,  the officials of  a  town, must  remove  and 
dispose of  some hazardous waste.  We  need to dig it up from the 
illegal dump near a residential area where it has lain for years and 
move it to a safer spot some distance away.  Digging it up and 
moving  it  will  inevitably  release  dangerous  chemicals  into  the 
atmosphere, but  this is better  than leaving it in its present loca- 
tion, where it will  in  the long  run seep into the water  supply. 
Obviously we must take precautions to minimize the risks involved 
in this operation.  We need to find a safe disposal site, far away 
from where people normally have to go.  We should build a high 
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the excavation is to be done, both of  them with large signs warn- 
ing of  the danger.  We should also arrange for the removal and 
transportation  to  be  carried  out  at times  when  few people  are 
around, in order to minimize the number potentially exposed, and 
we must be sure to have the material wetted down and transported 
in  covered  trucks  to minimize the amount of  chemicals released 
into the air.  Inevitably, however, enough chemicals will escape to 
cause lung damage to those who are directly exposed if, because of 
past  exposure  or  genetic predisposition,  they happen to be  par- 
ticularly sensitive, but not enough to pose a threat to anyone who 
stays indoors and away from the excavation site.  Given that this is 
so, we  should be  careful  to warn  people, especially  those  who 
know  that  they  are at risk,  to  stay  indoors  and away  from the 
relevant area while the chemicals are being moved. 
Suppose  that we do all of  these things but  that nonetheless 
some people are exposed.  A few of  these, who did not know that 
they were particularly  sensitive to the chemical, suffer lung dam- 
age.  Let me stipulate that with respect to all of  these people we 
did all that we could reasonably  be  expected  to do to warn and 
protect  them.  So  in that sense they “can’t complain” about what 
happened.  The question which concerns me, however, is what role 
the signs and warnings play in making this the case.  These are the 
factors  which  make  outcomes  depend  on people’s choices.  Are 
they,  like  the  fences,  the  careful  removal  techniques,  and  the 
remote location of  the new site, just further means through which 
the likelihood of someone’s being injured is reduced? This is what 
the Value of  Choice theory seems to imply.  For after all, since no 
one wants to have the opportunity to be exposed to this chemical, 
the only value which choice can have in this case is that of making 
exposure less likely.  This may be an adequate explanation of why 
we  would  want  to  be  warned  and  hence  “given  the  choice” 
whether to be exposed or not.  But it may not account for the full 
moral significance of  the fact that those who were injured “knew 
what they were getting into.”  Consider the following two  cases. 192  The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 
Suppose  that  one person  was  exposed  because,  despite  the 
newspaper  stories,  mailings,  posted  signs,  radio  and  television 
announcements,  and  sound  trucks,  he  never  heard  about  the 
danger.  He simply failed to  get  the word.  So  he  went  for his 
usual walk with no idea what was going on.  A second person, let 
us  suppose, heard the warnings but did not take them seriously. 
Curious to see how the task was being done, she sneaked past the 
guards and climbed the fence to get a better  look. 
There seems to be  a clear difference between these two cases. 
In the first, we have “done enough” to protect the person simply 
because, given what we have done, it was extremely unlikely that 
anyone would be directly exposed to contamination, and we could 
not  have  made  this  even  more  unlikely  without  inordinate ex- 
pense.  There is, after all, a limit to the lengths to which we must 
go to protect others.  The second person, on the other hand, bears 
the responsibility for her own injury, and it is this fact, rather than 
any consideration of  the cost to  us  of  doing more, which makes 
it the case that she has no claim against us. By choosing, in the 
face of  all our warnings,  to go to the  excavation  site,  she  laid 
down her right to complain of  the harm she suffered as a result. 
 4.THE   FORFEITURE VIEW
This  familiar  and  intuitively  powerful  idea  about  the  sig- 
nificance of  choice, which I will call “the Forfeiture View,” is not 
captured by  either of  the theories  I  have been considering.  It is 
distinct from the Value of Choice theory, since on that theory what 
matters is the value of  the choice a person is presented with: once 
a person has been placed  in  a sufficiently good position, the out- 
come which emerges is legitimate however it may have been pro- 
duced.  On the Forfeiture View,  on  the  other  hand,  it matters 
crucially that an outcome  actually resulted from an agent’s con- 
scious  choice,  the  agent  having  intentionally  passed  up  specific 
alternatives.  This is why that view accounts so well for our reac- 
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no one else to blame for her fate; she has herself to blame. We 
could account for this sense of blame by appealing to a prudential 
version of  the Quality of  Will theory: the process of  deliberation 
leading to a decision to climb over the fence “just to see what they 
are  doing”  is  obviously  faulty.  But  the Quality of  Will theory 
is an account of  the moral appraisal of  agents, while what we are 
concerned  with  here  is  the justification  of  outcomes.  It may be 
natural to suppose that a difference in the first translates into or 
supports a difference in the second, but on reflection it is by  no 
means obvious how this is so. 
Moreover,  the idea  of  fault  is  in  fact  irrelevant  here.  The 
intuition  to  which  the  Forfeiture  View  calls  attention  concerns 
the  significance of  the  fact of  choice, not the faultiness  of  that 
choice.  We  can  imagine  a  person  who,  unlike  the  imprudently 
curious woman in my example, did not run the risk of  contamina- 
tion  foolishly or thoughtlessly.  Suppose this third person found, 
just as the excavation was about to begin, that the day was a perfect 
one for working on an outdoor project to which she attached great 
value.  Aware of  the danger, she considered  the matter carefully 
and decided that taking into account her age and condition it was 
worth less to her to avoid the risk than to advance her project in 
the time she was likely to have remaining.  Surely this person is as 
fully “responsible for her fate” as the imprudent woman whom I 
originally  described.  But  her  decision  is  not  a  foolish  or mis- 
taken one. 
This illustrates  the fact that what lies behind  the Forfeiture 
View is not an idea of  desert.  That is, it is not an idea according 
to which  certain  choices, because  they  are  foolish,  immoral, or 
otherwise mistaken, positively merit certain outcomes or responses. 
The idea is rather that a person to whom a certain outcome was 
available, but who knowingly passed it up, cannot complain about 
not having it: volenti non fit iniuria. 
It is  important  to  remember  here  that  the challenge of  the 
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theory gives  an inadequate account of  the significance of  choice 
in the justification of  institutions, policies, and specific moral prin- 
ciples.  Once we have accepted as justified an institution or policy 
attaching specific consequences  to particular choices, there is no 
disagreement about whether these choices have the kind of  special 
force which the Forfeiture View claims. This force can be accounted 
for by appeal to the institutions, principles, or policies in question. 
The disagreement  concerns  the way  in which  such  institutions, 
principles, and policies  themselves  are to be justified.  When the 
Forfeiture View says that people who make certain choices “can- 
not  complain”  about  the harms  they  suffer  as  a result, what is 
meant is that these harms lack the force in this process of justifica- 
tion which otherwise comparable harms would have. 
It may seem that a view of  this kind is in fact forced on us by 
contractualism.  According to contractualism the crucial question 
about  a  proposed  moral  principle is whether  anyone  could  rea- 
sonably reject it.  In order for rejecting a principle to be reasonable 
it must at least be reasonable from the point of view of the person 
doing the rejecting, that is, the person who would bear the burden 
of  that principle.  It may  seem, therefore, that a harm which an 
agent has the opportunity to avoid  (without great sacrifice) could 
never  serve as a ground for reasonable rejection of  a moral prin- 
ciple.  Consider the following argument.  From the point of view 
of  an agent, an action which he has the choice of performing must 
be seen as available to him.  Suppose that an agent will run the 
risk of  suffering a certain harm if  he follows one course of  action 
but that he would avoid this harm if  he were to follow an alterna- 
tive  course which  is  available to him  and does not involve sig- 
nificant sacrifice.  Given, then, that the harm is from his point of 
view costlessly avoidable, how could the agent appeal to this harm 
as grounds for objecting, for example, to a principle freeing others 
from any duty to prevent  such harms from occurring?  It would 
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But this conclusion is not forced on us. In moral argument we 
are choosing principles to apply in general to situations in which 
we may  be  involved.  Even if  we know  that actions avoiding  a 
certain unwanted outcome will be available to us in a given situa- 
tion, we also know that our processes of choice are imperfect. We 
often choose the worse, sometimes even in the knowledge that it 
is the worse.  Therefore, even from the point of view of an agent 
looking at his own actions over time, situations of choice have to 
be  evaluated  not only  for what  they  make  “available” but  for 
what they make it likely  that one will choose.  It is not unrea- 
sonable to want to have some protection against the consequences 
of one’s own mistakes. 
5. REJECTING THE FORFEITURE VIEW
The appeal of the Forfeiture View can and should be resisted. 
Note, first,  that the Value of  Choice theory  can account for the 
apparent  difference between  the two victims of  hazardous waste 
removal  described  above.  We may  have  “done enough” to pro- 
tect the first person, who failed to hear of  the danger, in the sense 
that we have  gone to  as  much  effort  and expense  as  could  be 
expected.  But because we did not succeed in making him aware of 
the danger we did not make what happened depend on his choice. 
Given that this kind of  “choice-dependence” is something which 
we all would want for ourselves — we want such risks to be, as 
far as possible, “under our control” — we   did not make this per- 
son as well off  as we would reasonably want to be.  The second 
person,  on the other hand, did have  the benefit  of  “having the 
choice,” even though this turned out to be worth less to her than 
it would be to most of us. (There was in this case a divergence 
between  “individualized”  and “normalized” value.)  Given  that 
she had the choice, however, and was provided with the other pro- 
tections, it was true of her in a way that it was not of the first per- 
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From the fact that a person  chose, under good conditions, to 
take a risk, we may conclude that he alone is responsible for what 
happens to him as a result.  But this conclusion need not be seen 
as a reflection of  the special legitimating force of voluntary action. 
Rather, the fact that an outcome resulted from a person’s choice 
under  good conditions  shows  that he was  given  the choice and 
provided with good conditions for making it, and it is these facts 
which make it the case that he alone is responsible.  A conscious 
decision to  “take the risk” is  not necessary.  Consider, here, the 
case of  a person who was informed of  the risk of  contamination 
but then simply forgot.  As a result, he was out in his yard exercis- 
ing, breathing hard, when the trucks went by.  If enough was done 
to protect and warn him, then this person is responsible for what 
happens to him and “cannot complain of  it” even though he made 
no conscious decision to take the risk. 
The central element of  truth in the Forfeiture View is thus a 
consequence of  the Value of  Choice theory rather than an alterna- 
tive to it.  Putting this truth in terms of  the Forfeiture View, how- 
ever, has the distorting effect of  suggesting that choice has inde- 
pendent deontic force in the justification of  institutions and prin- 
ciples.  It also  exaggerates the importance of the fact of choice 
relative to that of the conditions under which the choice was made. 
The Forfeiture View suggests that these conditions are important 
only insofar as they bear on the voluntariness of  the choice.  This 
is a mistake.  The fact that a choice was voluntary does not always 
establish that we “did enough” for an agent by placing him or her 
in the position from which  the choice was made.  Nor does the 
fact that an agent did not voluntarily choose an outcome, or choose 
to  take  a  certain  risk,  establish  that what  resulted  was  not  his 
fault. Giving him the opportunity to choose may have constituted 
“doing enough” to protect him.  It is thus an important virtue of 
the Value of  Choice theory that it gives the conditions of  choice 
their appropriate independent weight and forces us to keep them 
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6. RESPONSIBILITY  AND THE MORAL DIVISION 
OF LABOR: BEYOND CHOICE 
Within  the  Value  of  Choice  theory,  ideas  of  responsibility 
arise  as  a  derived  (and  often  only  implicit)  moral division  of 
labor.  Because most people  take themselves to be more actively 
concerned with the promotion of  their own safety and well-being 
than  others  are,  they  want outcomes  to be  dependent on their 
choices  even when  this has  only  “avoidance value.”  Given this 
concern,  “giving  people  the  choice”  under  favorable  conditions 
makes it extremely unlikely  that they will suffer easily avoidable 
harms.  We do not want the trouble and expense of  supervising 
others’ choices more closely, and do not want them to be  super- 
vising  us.  Therefore,  we  take  the view  that giving  people the 
opportunity  of  avoiding  a  danger,  under  favorable  conditions, 
often constitutes  “doing enough” for them:  the  rest  is  their  re- 
sponsibility.  So  stated, this is not a principle but only a descrip- 
tion of  a general  tendency in our moral thought.  In particular, 
the idea of  “favorable conditions,” here left vague, must be filled 
in  before any specific principle of  responsibility is obtained, and 
this filling in will be done differently in the case of  different risks 
and dangers. 
This general analysis does, however, shed light on appeals to 
responsibility in cases in which the notion of  choice seems out of 
place.  The idea of  freedom of  thought, mentioned in my first lec- 
ture, is one such case.  Another, which I will discuss briefly here, 
is the idea of responsibility for one’s preferences. 
This idea  arises in the context of  debates as to whether, for 
purposes of  assessing claims of  justice, people’s welfare  should 
be  measured  in  terms of  preference  satisfaction or  in  terms of 
some  objective  standard of  well-being  such  as what Rawls  has 
called  Primary  Social  Goods.  Objective  standards  of  this  kind 
may  seem unfair, since the  same bundle  of  objective goods can 
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preferences.  Rawls  has  replied  that  someone  who  makes  this 
objection  “must  argue in addition that it is unreasonable, if  not 
unjust, to hold such persons responsible for their preferences and 
to require them to make out as best they can.”  To argue this, he 
says, “seems to presuppose  that citizens’ preferences  are beyond 
their  control as  propensities  or cravings  which  simply happen.” 
The use of an objective standard like primary goods, on the other 
hand, “relies on a capacity to assume responsibility for our ends.” 
The conception of  justice which Rawls advocates thus 
includes what we may call a social division of  responsibility: 
society, the citizens as a collective body, accepts responsibility 
for maintaining the equal basic  liberties and fair equality of 
opportunity, and for providing a fair share of  the other pri- 
mary goods for everyone within this framework, while citizens 
(as individuals)  and associations  accept the responsibility  for 
revising  and adjusting their  ends and aspirations  in view of 
the all-purpose means they can expect, given their present and 
foreseeable situation.  This division of responsibility  relies  on 
the capacity of  persons to assume responsibility for their ends 
and to moderate the claims they make on their social institu- 
tions in  accordance with  the use of  primary  goods.  Citizens’ 
claims  to  liberties,  opportunities  and  all-purpose  means  are 
made secure from the unreasonable demands of  others.28 
I  am  strongly inclined to agree with Rawls here, and I have 
defended  a  similar  position  myself.29  Nonetheless,  I  find  this 
argument somewhat worrisome, because it is easily misinterpreted 
as involving an  appeal  to the idea of  forfeiture which  I  argued 
against  above.  On this  interpretation, the argument is  that  the 
imagined objection to objective measures of welfare overlooks the 
fact that people’s preferences  are under their  control.  Given this 
28John  Rawls,  “Social  Unity  and  Primary  Goods,”  in  Amartya  Sen  and 
Bernard  Williams,  eds.,  Utilitarianism  and  Beyond  (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- 
versity Press, 1982), pp. 168, 169, 170. 
29In  “Preference  and  Urgency,”  Journal  of  Philosophy  72  (1975):  655-69. 
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fact, and in view of  the basic moral truth that one cannot com- 
plain of  harms one could have avoided, the objection is no objec- 
tion  at all: people whose  preferences are particularly  difficult to 
satisfy have only themselves to blame. 
There are two difficulties with  this argument.  First, for rea- 
sons I have already discussed, the “basic moral truth” to which it 
appeals seems open to serious doubt.  Second, even if  this “truth” 
is correct, the argument appears to exaggerate the degree of con- 
trol which  people have  over  their  preferences.  To be  sure, the 
argument does not suggest that people can alter their preferences 
by  simply deciding what to prefer; the kind of  control which  is 
envisaged is to be exercised through decisions affecting the devel- 
opment of  one’s preferences over time.  Even so, it is questionable 
how much control of  this kind people can realistically be assumed 
to exercise. 
This leads me to look for an alternative interpretation under 
which  the argument avoids these  difficulties while still retaining 
its force.  Following the general strategy which I have been advo- 
cating in this lecture, this alternative interpretation takes the idea 
of responsibility for one’s preferences to be part of the view being 
defended rather  than  an independent moral premise.  As  Rawls 
says,  the  conception  of  justice  which  he  is  defending  includes 
“what we may call a social division of  responsibility.”  The ques- 
tion  is how this combination — an objective standard of  welfare 
and the idea of responsibility which it entails — can be defended 
without appeal to anything like the notion of  forfeiture. 
The issue  here  is  the  choice  between  two  types  of  public 
standards of  justice, objective standards of  the sort just described, 
according to which institutions are judged on the degree to which 
they provide their citizens with good objective conditions for the 
development and satisfaction of  their preferences, and subjective 
standards, under which  institutions are also judged on the basis 
of  the levels of  preference satisfaction which actually result from 
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argument for a “moral division of  labor” rested on three claims: 
the value which we attach to having outcomes depend on our own 
choices (even when this is only “avoidance value”), our reluctance 
to have  our choices  supervised by  others,  and our  reluctance  to 
bear  the costs of  protecting  others beyond  a certain  point.  The 
case  for the “social division of  responsibility”  entailed by  objec- 
tive standards of welfare rests on three analogous claims. We rea- 
sonably attach a high value to forming our own preferences under 
favorable conditions, and one reason  for this is our expectation 
that we will to some extent be steered away from forming prefer- 
ences when we can see that they will be difficult to satisfy and will 
lead mainly to frustration.  Second, we do not want others to be 
taking an active role in determining what we will prefer.  And 
third, we do not want to be burdened with the costs of  satisfying 
other people’s preferences when these are much more costly than 
our own. 
The first of  these claims accounts for the  (limited)  force of 
the idea, to which Rawls appeals, that people can to some extent 
avoid  “costly” preferences.  But  it does this without invoking a 
preinstitutional  notion  of  forfeiture,  and without  assuming  the 
degree of  conscious and deliberate control which  the Forfeiture 
View would require. 
The second  claim  is  especially  important.  Particularly  in  a 
society marked by  sharp disagreements  about what is worth pre- 
ferring, a public standard of  justice requiring government policy 
to be aimed at raising individual levels of  satisfaction is an open 
invitation to unwelcome governmental intervention in the forma- 
tion of  individuals’ values and preferences.  The “social division 
of  responsibility”  which goes with  an objective standard of  wel- 
fare is therefore an attractive alternative. 
The case for an objective standard of  welfare is thus largely 
defensive.  Giving up the claim to a greater share of  resources in 
the  event that  one’s preferences turn out to be particularly dif- 
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governmental  interference  and  greater  freedom from  the  pos- 
sibly  burdensome  demands  of  other  people’s  preferences.  The 
role of the possibility of modifying one’s preferences (or of avoid- 
ing the formation of  preferences which are difficult to satisfy)  is 
just  to  make this price  smaller and not, as the Forfeiture View 
would have it, to license the result. 
7. CONCLUSION 
In this lecture I have presented the idea of the Value of Choice 
as part of  a general strategy explaining the moral significance of 
choice in  the justification  of  social institutions  and policies.  As 
compared  with  its  main  rival,  the  Forfeiture  View,  this  strategy 
has the advantage of  assigning choice an important positive value 
without exaggerating its role and significance in justification.  It 
remains  to be  seen what kind of  freedom the Value of  Choice 
theory  presupposes and how  it  fits together  with the Quality of 
Will theory to account for the significance of choice across a range 
of  cases.  These questions will  be  addressed in my  next lecture. 
Lecture 3 
1. PUNISHMENT AND PROTECTION 
Let me begin with a schematic comparison of the institution of 
punishment and the policy of  hazardous  waste disposal which  I 
discussed in my  last lecture.  In each case we have the following 
elements.  First,  there is an important social goal: protecting the 
water  supply in the one case; protecting ourselves  and our pos- 
sessions in the other.  Second, there is  a  strategy for promoting 
that goal which involves the creation of  another risk: the risk of 
contamination in the one case, the risk of punishment in the other. 
Third, the effect of  this strategy is to make it the case that there 
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can no longer enter without danger.  In the one case this is the 
area of  excavation, transport, and disposal, in the other the “area” 
of  activities which  have been  declared illegal.  Fourth,  although 
we  introduce  certain  safeguards  to reduce  exposure  to  the risk 
created,  it  remains  the  case that many  of  those  who  choose  to 
enter the affected area, and perhaps a few others, will suffer harm. 
Some of  these safeguards  (such  as requirements of  due process, 
and careful methods of  excavation and transport)  have the effect 
of  protecting  those who choose to stay out of  the affected area. 
Other safeguards enhance the value of  choice as  a protection by 
making  it less  likely  that  people  will  choose  to  enter.  In the 
hazardous  waste case these include signs, warnings, and publicity 
to inform people about the nature of  the risk, as well as fences, 
guards, and the choice of  an obscure disposal site where no one 
has reason  to go.  Analogous features in the case of punishment 
are  education,  including  moral  education,  the  dissemination  of 
basic information  about  the law, and the maintenance of  social 
and economic  conditions which  reduce  the incentive  to commit 
crime by  offering the possibility  of  a  satisfactory life within the 
law.  Restrictions  on  “entrapment”  by  law  enforcement officers 
also belong in this category of safeguards which make it less likely 
that one will choose badly.  Without such safeguards the value of 
choice as a protection would be reduced to an unacceptable level. 
In each case, in order to defend the institution in question we 
need to claim that the importance of  the social goal justifies creat- 
ing the risk and making the affected area unusable and that, given 
the prevailing conditions and the safeguards we have put in place, 
we have  done enough to protect  people  against  suffering  harm 
from the threat that has been created. 
Now let me turn to some of  the differences between  the two 
cases.  First, insofar as the activities which make up “the affected 
area” in the case of punishment are ones which it is morally wrong 
to engage  in, being  deprived  of  the ability  to  “enter this  area” 
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makes  the  task  of  justification  easier  than  in  the  example  of 
hazardous waste. 
A  second  difference makes this task  more difficult, however. 
In neither  case is  it our  aim that people  should suffer the new 
harm,  though  in  both  cases  the possibility  of  their  doing so is 
created by  our policy.  But in the case of  punishment this harm, 
when it occurs, is intentionally  inflicted on particular  people.  It 
is an essential part of  that institution that people who run afoul of 
the law should be punished; but it is no part of our waste-removal 
policy  that those who enter the affected area  should suffer con- 
tamination.  If, as I believe, intentionally inflicting harm is in most 
cases more difficult to justify than merely failing to prevent harm, 
it  follows  that  an  institution  of  punishment  carries  a  heavier 
burden of justification. 
When such an institution is justified, however, this justification 
entails the kind of  “forfeiture” which we looked for but did not 
find  in  the  hazardous  waste  case.  A  person  who  intentionally 
commits a crime lays down his or her right not to suffer the pre- 
scribed punishment.  This forfeiture is a consequence of  the jus- 
tification  of  the institution of  punishment, however, not an ele- 
ment in that justification.  It is a consequence, specifically, of  the 
“heavier justificatory burden” just mentioned: because the institu- 
tion  assigns  punishment to  those  who  fulfill  certain  conditions, 
justifying the institution involves justifying the infliction of  these 
penalties.  If  the conditions for punishment include having made 
a  certain  kind  of  choice, then  a justification  for the institution 
justifies making that choice a necessary and, when the other con- 
ditions are fulfilled, sufficient condition for punishment.  No such 
assignment  and hence  no  such forfeiture  is  involved in the jus- 
tification of the policy of hazardous waste removal.  A person who 
recklessly chooses to enter the affected area does not lay down a 
right to further protection against contamination: she has already 
received  all  the protection  she is  entitled  to.  She does  not lay 
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scribed and the policy including this prescription is justified.  For- 
feiture, like economic desert, is the creature of  particular social 
institutions and relatively specific moral principles  (such as those 
governing promising).  It is not a moral feature of  choice in gen- 
eral.  As  I  argued in my  last lecture, the moral aspect of  choice 
which figures in the justification and criticism of  such institutions 
and principles is not forfeiture but the less-sharp-edged notion of 
the value of choice. 
I  have been  assuming  that “the affected area” is  so  defined 
that one can “enter” it only by  conscious choice.  This will be so 
if we identify “entering” that area with committing a crime whose 
definition involves conditions of  voluntariness and intent.  But a 
system of  criminal  law  incorporating  elements of  strict  liability 
could also fit the abstract model I have described,  If a legal penalty 
is  attached  to  selling adulterated milk  (not merely to doing so 
knowingly,  recklessly,  or  negligently),  then  one  “enters  the 
affected area” simply by  going into the milk business, and if  such 
a law is justified then doing this involves laying down one’s right 
not to be penalized if  the milk one sells turns out to be impure. 
This enlargement of  the affected area is one reason  (perhaps not 
the only one) why such laws are more difficult to justify, especially 
since the newly affected area includes activities, such as conscien- 
tious engagement in the milk business, which people are morally 
entitled to engage in.  Having them entail forfeiture of  the right 
not to be punished is a morally cognizable loss. 
2. EXCUSES AND THE VALUE OF CHOICE 
I said in my first lecture that an acceptable account of the sig- 
nificance of  choice  should  be  able to explain  standardly  recog- 
nized  excusing  conditions  in  a  way  that will not generalize to 
undermine the moral significance of all choice if  the Causal Thesis 
is true.  Let me now say something about how the Value of Choice 
theory fulfills this assignment.  My  aim here is not to derive par- 
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appropriate to particular social institutions  and moral principles. 
This would be an extremely time-consuming task, since it is rea- 
sonable to suppose that these conditions will vary in detail from 
case to case.  My present purpose is merely to point out in a more 
general way how the Value of  Choice theory would account for 
these conditions and for their variation. 
The general point  is obvious.  If  the justification  for a prin- 
ciple or institution depends in part on the value of  the choices it 
presents people with, and if  the value of  these choices in turn can 
vary greatly depending on the presence or absence of certain con- 
ditions, then in order to be justifiable the institution will have to 
qualify the consequences it attaches to choices by  explicitly requir- 
ing  the  presence  or  absence  of  the  most  important  of  these 
conditions. 
Lack of  knowledge of the nature of  the alternatives available, 
lack of  time to consider them, and the disruptive effects of  fear or 
emotional  distress can  all weaken the connection between  a per- 
son’s reaction  at a given time and his or her more stable prefer- 
ences, values, and sensitivities, thus undermining both the predic- 
tive and demonstrative value of  choice.  Coercion and duress can 
have similar disrupting effects on the process of  choice, but also 
and more often they diminish the value of  choice simply by  con- 
tracting or altering the set of  alternatives between which one can 
choose.  Diminishing  the  set  of  alternatives  or weighting  some 
with penalties can sometimes increase the value of choice — or so 
those of  us must believe who sign up to give lectures we have not 
yet written and buy automobiles with seat belt buzzers.  But this is 
not usually the case. 
Even  when  duress,  false  belief,  or  other  conditions  clearly 
diminish  the value of  choice, however, it does  not immediately 
follow that these conditions must be recognized as negating a par- 
ticular obligation or liability.  Whether it does or not will depend 
on, among other things, the costs to others of  introducing such an 
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further reason why, on the present theory, it is possible for excus- 
ing conditions to vary from principle to principle  and institution 
to institution. 
Here there is a clear contrast with the genesis of excusing con- 
ditions under the Quality of  Will theory.  Once we learn that an 
agent  acted  under  duress  or  under  the influence  of  a mistaken 
belief, this immediately alters the “will” attributable to that agent. 
There is no need to ask what the effect would be of  recognizing 
this  “excuse.”  Of  course, such considerations are relevant to the 
further question of which  “qualities of will” should be  regarded 
as morally deficient.  But the Quality of  Will theory plays no role 
in answering this question; it is an account only of  the process of 
moral appraisal. 
A second contrast between the two theories is this.  The Value 
of  Choice theory treats changes in the set of  alternatives available 
to a person and changes in the conditions under which he or she 
chooses  among them  as  factors contributing to the answer  to a 
single question: how good or bad a thing is it to be presented with 
that choice ?  Under the Quality of Will theory, on the other hand, 
there is an important difference here.  Some conditions affect the 
degree  to which  a  “will” can  be  imputed  to the  agent; others 
modify the nature of that will. This difference may explain Hart’s 
remark that while continental jurisprudence has traditionally  dis- 
tinguished  between  imputability  and  fault  he  sees  little  to  be 
gained by  observing this rigid distinction.30    This difference is to 
be  expected  insofar  as  Hart is  speaking  as  a  Value  of  Choice 
theorist  while  the continental  tradition  may  be  more concerned 
with aspects of the law akin to quality of will. 
3. THE VALUE OF CHOICE AND THE CAUSAL THESIS 
I  turn now to the question of  whether choice will retain the 
moral significance which  the Value of  Choice theory assigns it if 
the Causal Thesis is true. Whether it does so or not will depend on 
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whether choice will retain its value for an individual if  the Causal 
Thesis is true.  This is at least part of what I called in my first lec- 
ture  “the personal  problem  of  free will.”  So  it  seems that the 
most  that  the Value  of  Choice  theory  could  accomplish  would 
be  to  reduce  the political  problem  of  free will  to the personal 
problem. 
The mere truth of  the Causal Thesis would not deprive choice 
of  its predictive value: a person’s choices could remain indicative 
of  his or her future preferences and satisfactions even if  they had 
a  systematic causal  explanation.  Nor, it seems to me, need  the 
demonstrative value of  choice be undermined.  A person’s choices 
could  still  reflect  continuing  features  of  his  or  her  personality 
such as  feelings for others, memory, knowledge,  skill, taste, and 
discernment. 
This is how  things seem to me, perhaps because I am in the 
grip of  a theory.  It is difficult to support these intuitions by argu- 
ment because it is difficult, for me at least, to identify clearly the 
basis of  the intuitions which  move one toward the opposite con- 
clusion.  It might be claimed that what I have called the demon- 
strative value of choice would be undermined because the feelings, 
attitudes,  and so on which  a person’s choices might be taken to 
“reflect”  will  no  longer  “belong”  to  that  person  if  the Causal 
Thesis is true, but it is not clear why this should be the case.  It is 
easy to see that particular  kinds of  causal history might make a 
belief  or  desire  “alien.”  This  would  happen  when,  as  in  the 
“implantation”  examples  mentioned  above,  the  special  causal 
genesis of  a belief  meant also that it lacked connection with the 
person’s other conscious states —   that it was not all dependent on 
other beliefs and desires for support and not subject to modifica- 
tion through the agent’s process of  critical reflection.  But it does 
not seem that this kind of  loss of  connection need hold generally 
if the Causal Thesis is correct. 
One  can  certainly  imagine  a  form  of  causal  determination 
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would make it inappropriate to speak of a person’s holding beliefs 
and attitudes at all.  A person’s conscious states might be caused 
to occur in a pattern which made no sense at all “from the inside,” 
following one another in a random and meaningless sequence pre- 
serving no continuity of belief or attitude.  It might be argued that 
the “normal case” is more like this than we are inclined to sup- 
pose:  that our idea of  the coherence and regularity of  our con- 
scious life is to a large degree an illusion.  This might undermine 
the sense of  self on which the value of  choice depends.  But this, 
if  true, would be the result of  a particular substantive claim about 
the order and coherence of  the events that make up our “mental 
lives.”  It would not be a consequence of  the bare Causal Thesis 
itself. 
4. FREEDOM AND OVERDETERMINATION 
The kind of freedom required by the Value of Choice theory 
is  in  one  respect  more  extensive  than  that  required  for moral 
appraisal of the kind discussed in my first lecture. This difference 
can be brought out by considering how the ideas of  quality of will 
and value of  choice apply to overdetermination cases of  the kind 
introduced by  Harry Frankfurt.31  Frankfurt’s central example in- 
volves two drug addicts.  It is assumed that neither is capable of 
resisting the pull of  his addiction: both will take the drug when it 
is  offered,  and neither  could  do otherwise.  But  while  one, the 
“unwilling addict,” would prefer that the desire to take the drug 
not be the one which he acts on, the other, “the willing addict,” 
not only has a desire for the drug but also has the “second-order 
desire”  to act  on that  desire.  Frankfurt  believes that  the latter 
addict acts freely in the sense required for moral responsibility but 
that the former does not.  What interests me here is the fact that 
the two theories I have presented appear to give different answers 
to the question of freedom in cases like that of  Frankfurt’s willing 
addict — that is to say, cases in which (for reasons which may or 
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may not be like those in Frankfurt’s particular example)  a person 
has no  alternative to  doing a certain  thing but nonetheless gets 
what he wants or does what he is inclined to do.  If the question 
is whether the action reflects the agent’s quality of will, then cases 
like that of  Frankfurt’s willing addict seem to be cases of freedom. 
(This answer agrees with Frankfurt, which is not surprising given 
that he is concerned specifically with moral responsibility.)  If, on 
the other hand, the question is whether the agent has been given 
a fair chance to make outcomes conform to or exhibit his or her 
preferences and abilities, then the answer seems to be no, and the 
cases count as instances of unfreedom. 
It may seem that this difference is illusory.  The question under 
the Value of Choice theory is whether there was the right kind of 
opportunity for the person’s disposition to choose to be discovered 
and registered.  Insofar as it is predictive value we are concerned 
with,  the  assumption  is  that  “we”  do  not  generally  know  in 
advance what a person’s preference is: we are trying to set up a 
social mechanism  to discover this and react to it.  In Frankfurt’s 
cases, however, it is assumed that we know the addicts’ (first- and 
second-order)  preferences.  Indeed, we are assumed to know more 
about this than agents themselves normally  do.  The question of 
how  these  preferences  might  be  discovered  is  not  at  issue  in 
Frankfurt’s discussion.  But this question can arise with respect to 
moral responsibility.  Administering praise and blame is something 
we do, and it is relevant to ask whether we have adequate grounds 
for doing so: whether it is fair to judge a person on the basis we 
have.  This is like the question which  arose in application of  the 
Value of  Choice theory: whether there was adequate opportunity 
for the person’s preferences, whatever they may have been, to be 
revealed. 
This same question of  fairness can also be raised when we are 
only forming an opinion about an agent’s blameworthiness, with- 
out intending to express it.  But the question whether the agent is 
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and it is the question which is fundamental: if  the person’s will in 
doing the action was of  the appropriate sort, then a certain moral 
judgment is in fact applicable, whether or not any particular per- 
son is in a position to make it.  Insofar as this is the case, the dif- 
ference between the two theories that was pointed out above still 
stands. 
Of  course, parallel to the fact that a person “really was blame- 
worthy” in acting  a certain way, there is the fact that a person 
“really did want X, which was what he got,” and this too might 
be held to be the fundamental fact, on the basis of which we could 
ask, How can he complain, since he got what he wanted? But this 
fact of  preference is not fundamental in the way that the fact of 
blameworthiness  is:  the two  facts  are  differently  related  to  the 
moral ideas on which the theories in which they figure are based. 
The Quality of  Will theory is based on the idea that the applica- 
bility of  moral praise and blame depends on what the quality of 
will  expressed  in  an  action  actually  was.  In  determining  this 
quality we may need to know what the agent believed the alterna- 
tives to be, but the question of which of  these were actually avail- 
able is in at least some cases irrelevant. Under the Value of Choice 
theory, however, the basic moral  idea is not simply that people 
should get what they want but that things should be set up so that 
outcomes are made dependent on people’s choices.  In overdeter- 
mination cases this demand may not have been met, even though, 
as it happens, the person is in certain respects no worse off  as a 
result. 
5. THE TWO THEORIES COMBINED 
I have described two theories and said something about how 
they are related to one another.  It remains to be seen how these 
two  theories, when  combined, cover the territory.  I  have so far 
employed the Value of  Choice theory mainly to give an account 
of  the significance of  choice in “political” cases, and I have relied 
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But this division of  labor is overly simple.  In fact, both analyses 
are required to account for the significance of  choice in morality, 
and both are required to explain its force in the law. 
Let  me  take  the moral  case first.  Suppose you  think that I 
promised on Monday to pick up your child at school on Tuesday 
but then failed to do this.  There are two ways in which considera- 
tions of  voluntariness and choice might enter into an assessment 
of how blameworthy I am on this account.  First, such considera- 
tions could undermine my blameworthiness by making it the case 
that I had no obligation to pick up your child in the first place.  It 
could be that I never assented to your request: when I said yes, it 
was  to  something  else,  and  I  never  heard your  request  at all. 
Or perhaps  I  did  assent  to  your  request  but  only  because  you 
threatened me or concealed from me the fact that I would have to 
wait three hours beyond the normal end of the school day.  Factors 
such as these could erase or modify my obligation. 
On the other hand, it could be that while I did indeed incur an 
obligation  to you, my  not meeting your child was not due to any 
failure on my  part to take my obligation seriously and try to ful- 
fill it.  It might be that I was hit over the head and knocked un- 
conscious just before I was to leave, or that my car broke down on 
the way, leaving me stranded in a deserted spot. 
These  two  kinds  of  excusing  conditions  are  quite  different. 
Something like the Value of  Choice theory  seems to provide the 
best explanation of  why moral obligations are qualified by restric- 
tions of the first sort.  As Hart suggested, a system for the making 
of  binding agreements, whether moral or legal, is defensible only 
if  it is constrained  by  restrictions  to ensure  that the obligations 
one  acquires  are  obligations  one judges  to  be  worth  acquiring. 
The  assessment  of  quality  of  will  has  at  most  a  secondary  role 
here. 
Things are reversed in a case of  involuntary nonfulfillment of 
a  valid  obligation.  Here  the  natural  value  of  choice  analysis 
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punishment)  would  be that a morality which held agents liable 
to  blame  in  such  cases would  be  objectionable  because it gave 
people insufficient “protection”  against incurring the sanction of 
moral blame.  This is clearly not the right explanation.  It is wrong 
because it treats moral blame simply as a “sanction” which people 
would like to avoid, which we attach to certain actions although 
it could just as well be attached to others (eg., to things that are 
done involuntarily).  This ignores the distinctive content of moral 
blame, in virtue  of  which  it is  not  simply  another  kind of  un- 
pleasant  treatment, like  being  shunned.  Morality  is,  at base,  a 
system of mutually authorizable deliberation.  To feel oneself sub- 
ject to moral blame is to be aware of  a gap between the way one 
in fact decided what to do and the form of  decision which others 
could reasonably demand.  The absence of  such a gap is by  itself 
a sufficient explanation of  why blame is inapplicable in cases like 
that of the person who, despite his or her best efforts, fails to pick 
up the child.  There is  no need to refer to the kind of  question 
which the Value of Choice theory addresses. 
This  internal  connection  between  the  nature of  “the moral 
sanction”  and the  content  of  morality — between  the nature of 
blame  and  the  things  one  can  be  blamed  for  —  differentiates 
morality  from a social institution set up to serve certain extrinsic 
purposes.  Of  course there could be a social practice according to 
which people would be subject to scolding and shunning in cases 
for actions involving no faulty willing or  deliberation, but what 
was expressed by  this behavior would not be moral blame.  Even 
without such a practice there is a question, distinct from that of 
blameworthiness, of  whether  one has good reason  to engage in 
“blaming behavior” toward a given person  on a given occasion. 
As I mentioned in my first lecture, even when people are blame- 
worthy it might be callous to scold them, and the reverse may also 
be true.  For  example, even though very young children  are not 
blameworthy  it may  be  important  for  their  moral education to 
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The issues raised here are similar to those which arise in con- 
nection  with what Hart called  the  “definitional stop”  argument 
against exemplary or vicarious punishment of persons known to be 
innocent  of  any  off  ense.32  A  utilitarian  justification  of  punish- 
ment,  insofar  as  it  is  a  justification  of  punishment,  could  not 
justify  such practices,  this  argument ran, because these practices 
do not count as punishment, which, by  definition, must be of  an 
offender for an offense.  The obvious response to this argument is 
that it is  not important what we call it; the question  is why it 
would not be permissible to subject people, known to be innocent, 
to unpleasant  treatment  (prison, fines, etc.)  as part of  a scheme 
to intimidate others ,into obeying the law.  As  I have said above, 
I agree with Hart that the Value of Choice theory provides a good 
(though  perhaps  not  fully  satisfying)  answer  to  this  question. 
With respect to moral blame, however, I have responded in effect 
that it matters a great deal what you call it, because blameworthi- 
ness, rather than any form of  “blaming behavior,” is the central 
issue.  There is also, of  course, a question of  the desirability and 
permissibility  of  expressing or  administering blame in  a certain 
way, but this is a separate question and a secondary one. 
In the case of  criminal punishment this emphasis is reversed: 
the main question is whether we can justify  depriving people of 
their  property,  their  liberty,  or  even  their  lives.33  Despite  the 
32Punishment and Responsibility, pp. 5-6. 
33In a recent article, R. B. Brandt put forward something like the Quality of 
Will  theory  as  a  limitation  on  legal  punishment.  See  “A  Motivational  Theory  of 
Excuses  in  the  Criminal  Law,”  in  J.  R.  Pennock  and  J.  W.  Chapman,  eds., 
NOMOS  XXVII:  Criminal  Justice  (New  York:  New  York  University  Press,  1985), 
pp.  165-98.  Specifically,  Brandt  defends  the  principle  that  a  condition  should  be 
recognized  as  excusing a person from legal blame if  the presence of  that condition 
“blocks  the normal  inference” from the fact  that the agent performed a certain  act 
to  the conclusion that the agent’s motivation is defective.  His defense of  this  prin- 
ciple appeals to the value of  assuring people that if  they lack “defective motivation” 
they  will  almost  certainly  not  be  punished.  This  is  reminiscent  of  Hart  and  the 
Value  of  Choice  theory,  but  Brandt’s  defense  is  avowedly  rule-utilitarian:  he  sees 
the  value  in  question  merely  as  a  contribution  to  the  general  welfare,  not  as  ful- 
filling  a  special  requirement  of  fairness  to  the  individual.  Moreover,  he  sees  the 
requirement of “defective motivation” as a replacement for Hart’s notion of “capac- 214  The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 
changed emphasis, however,  both  elements  are still present, and 
consequently  it does  “matter what you  call it” even if  this con- 
sideration does not settle the crucial question of  justification.  The 
law  is not just  an organized system of  threats.  It also provides 
rules and standards which good citizens are supposed to “respect,” 
that is, to employ as a way of  deciding what to do — not simply 
as a way of  avoiding sanctions but as a set of  norms which they 
accept  as reason-giving.  This important feature of  law offers a 
further reason why the Value of  Choice theory was not completely 
satisfying as an explanation of the choice requirement for criminal 
punishment.  Insofar as punishment  is  in  part  an expression  of 
“legal blame,” as Feinberg and others have pointed out,34 there
is  a  special  inappropriateness  in having  it  fall on persons  who 
have deliberated and acted just as the law says they should.  The 
Value of  Choice theory thus fails to be a complete account of  the 
significance of  choice in the law for much the same reason that it 
fails  to be  a complete account in the case of  morality.  In each 
case there is something  to the “definitional stop.” 
Something,  perhaps,  but in the case of the law, how much? 
Pointing out “the expressive function of  punishment” helps us to 
understand our reactions to punishing particular kinds of  people, 
but what role if  any  does it have  in the justification of  punish- 
ment?  It seems to have no positive role in justifying hard treat- 
ment of the legally blameworthy.  Insofar as expression is our aim, 
we  could  just  as  well  “say  it with  flowers”  or,  perhaps  more 
appropriately, with weeds.  Nor, it seems, is this idea the central 
explanation of the apparent wrongfulness of  punishing, say, young 
children or the mentally ill.  Assuming that these people lack the 
ity and  fair opportunity” to avoid punishment  (ibid.,  p. 180). My analysis is simi- 
lar to Brandt’s in a number  of  respects, but, unlike him, I  see quality of  will and 
the value of  choice  as  two  independent (though related)  reasons  for the limits of 
moral  and  legal  blameworthiness.  Since  they  are related,  it is  not surprising that 
these two kinds  of  reasons often support the same limits.  But they do not always 
do so. 
34Joel  Feinberg,  “The  Expressive  Function  of  Punishment,”  in  Doing  and 
Deserving  (Princeton: Princeton University Press,  1970). 
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capacity for critically reflective, rational self-governance, we could 
argue, as we did in the case of  morality, that they cannot be legally 
blameworthy.  But even in the case of morality, the justification of 
“blaming behavior” is a separate issue from that of  blameworthi- 
ness, and here it is a much weightier one in view of the losses that 
the law can inflict. 
The Value of  Choice theory offers a more plausible explana- 
tion.  According to that theory the lack of  the normal capacity for 
critically  reflective,  rational  self-governance  is  relevant  because 
people who lack it are so unlikely to be deterred. This may or may 
not make punishment pointless  for us, but it certainly makes it 
unfair to them: we must protect them against punishment just as, 
in  my  other  example, we must  post  barriers  or guards  to keep 
people with Alzheimer’s disease away from the hazardous waste. 
But  within  the Value of  Choice theory the normal capacity  for 
critically  reflective,  rational  self-governance lacks  the distinctive 
importance which it has when moral  (or legal) blameworthiness 
is at issue.  There are many people who have this capacity yet will 
not be  deterred.  It is easy to say why they are blameworthy, but 
why should we respond differently to their suffering than to that 
of the mentally ill? We can say that, because they have this normal 
capacity for self-governance, deterrence is a plausible strategy for 
us  to  use  in  dealing with them  and that the possibility  of  their 
being deterred is, from their point of view, some  measure of  pro- 
tection.  If it turns out not to be enough, then the best we can say, 
if  it is true, is that we did as much as we could be expected to do 
to protect them. 
At some moments it seems to me that we must be able to say 
more —   that  choice  has  a  further  significance  not  captured  by 
either of  the theories I have considered, perhaps something more 
like what the Forfeiture View is straining toward. At other times, 
however, it seems to me an advantage of  the combined theory I 
have been defending, and a natural consequence of  its aspiration 
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position:  moral and  (if  there is such a thing)  legal indignation 
toward  lawbreakers  is  entirely  in  order,  and  the  sufferings  we 
inflict upon them may be justified. But in justifying these suffer- 
ings, and inflicting them, we have to say not “You asked for this” 
but “There but for the grace of God go I.” 